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Abstract  This  article  analyses  Robbins’s  famous  deﬁnition  of  economics.  It  shows  that  this
deﬁnition was  introduced  by  the  author  to  solve  long-standing  problems  regarding  the  subject-
matter of  the  science  that  were  associated  with  some  of  the  existing  deﬁnitions.  The  article
also draws  attention  to  some  confusion  that  surrounds  the  way  Robbins  understood  the  (new)
subject-matter  and  which  also  slid  into  his  deﬁnition.  To  escape  the  ambiguities  caused  by
Robbins’s confusion,  we  propose  a  more  precise  way  of  understanding  the  subject-matter  of  eco-
nomics. The  insight  gained  reveals  that  Robbins’s  deﬁnition  really  contains  two  sub-deﬁnitions:
one that  describes  the  subject-matter  (real  scarcity) and  another  that  describes  the  method  of
the science  (formal  scarcity).  This  ﬁnding  sheds  light  on  some  analyses  and  interpretations  of
this deﬁnition  in  the  literature.
©  2016  Asociacio´n  Cuadernos  de  Economı´a.  Published  by  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  All  rights
reserved.
CÓDIGOS  JEL
20
PALABRAS  CLAVE
Una  nueva  interpretación  de  la  deﬁnición  de  Economía  de  Robbins:  los  conceptos  de
escasez  real  y  formal
Resumen  Este  artículo  estudia  la  conocida  deﬁnición  de  Economía  propuesta  por  Robbins.
Deﬁnición  de
Economía;
Escasez  real;
En él  se  muestra,  primero,  que  este  autor  propone  su  deﬁnición  en  un  intento  de  resolver
algunos problemas  inveterados  relacionados  con  la  noción  de  esta  ciencia.  Seguidamente,  elEscasez  Formal;
Robbins
artículo destaca  algunas  confusiones  contenidas  en  los  textos  en  que  Robbins  alude  a  dicha
deﬁnición.  Para  resolverlas,  se  propone  aquí  un  modo  más  preciso  de  entender  el  tema  de
la ciencia  económica.  El  estudio  realizado  revela  que  la  deﬁnición  de  Robbins  contiene,  en
verdad, dos  sub-deﬁniciones:  una  que  describe  el  tema  de  la  ciencia  (o  escasez  real)  y  otra  queE-mail address: ifs@uma.es
1 Investigador Colaborador del Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales Francisco de Vitoria (IIESFV) y del grupo de investigación
‘‘Filosofía y Economía’’.
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84  I.  Falgueras-Sorauren
describe  el  método  de  la  ciencia  (o  escasez  formal).  Este  hallazgo  permite  entender  las  distintas
interpretaciones  (a  veces  contradictorias)  de  esta  deﬁnición  que  existen  en  la  literatura.
© 2016  Asociacio´n  Cuadernos  de  Economı´a.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  Todos  los
derechos reservados.
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passionate  debates,  pointed  out  in  a  more  disinterested
and  objective  way  the  two  main  implications  of  Robbins’s
deﬁnition:  its  ‘‘breadth’’,  i.e.  the  widening  of  the  scope
that economic theorists were then doing at the time when they did. Introduction
obbins’s  An  Essay  on  the  Nature  and  Signiﬁcance  of  Eco-
omic  Science  (denoted  hereafter  as  Essay)2 is  probably  the
est  known  and  most  widely  quoted  work  on  the  methodol-
gy  and  philosophy  of  economics  of  the  last  century,  as  Corry
1987:  207)  and  Backhouse  (1985:  268)  point  out.  As  the  lat-
er  author  explained,  one  of  the  major  themes  of  this  book
as  the  subject  matter  of  the  science.  When  Robbins  dealt
ith  this  issue,  he  provided  a  deﬁnition  of  economics  which,
ccording  to  Backhouse  and  Medema  (2008;  2009b:  225),  is
till  the  most  currently  accepted  deﬁnition  of  the  science  --
erhaps  due  in  part  to  the  lack  of  interest  that  economists
ave  recently  exhibited  regarding  the  task  of  deﬁning  their
cience  (Backhouse  and  Medema,  2008).
Nevertheless,  the  fact  of  its  general  acceptance  should
ot  mask  the  fact  that  there  are  certain  aspects  of  Rob-
ins’s  deﬁnition  that  still  need  to  be  clariﬁed,  despite  a  vast
iterature  on  the  subject.  To  the  possible  surprise  of  the
eader,  the  ﬁrst  and  most  important  question  to  be  eluci-
ated  is  what  this  deﬁnition  refers  to.  Although  it  is  obvious
- and  therefore,  undisputed  --  that  Robbins  was  deﬁning  eco-
omic  science,  it  is  still  an  open  question  which  aspect  of
he  science  he  was  deﬁning.  This  difﬁculty  has  passed  unno-
iced  up  to  the  present,  possibly  because  the  content  of
he  deﬁnition  seems  to  be  evident  from  the  way  in  which
obbins  informally  referred  to  it,  i.e.  ‘‘the  deﬁnition  of  the
ubject  matter  of  the  science’’.3 This  is  deﬁnitely  the  way
ome  contemporary  authors  have  interpreted  Robbins’s  deﬁ-
ition,  e.g.  Lawson  (1997:  95--97;  2003:  143,  151).  However,
he  literature  on  Robbins  deﬁnition  also  more  or  less  implic-
tly  advances  the  view  that  it  describes  the  method  of  the
cience.4 The  question  of  which  of  the  two  former  inter-
2 The speciﬁc version of the Essay I have used is Robbins (1962).
n the following, references to this work will be made by writing
he abbreviation of this work followed by the number of the page
n brackets.
3 Robbins described his deﬁnitions in these terms at least in Essay
24), Robbins (1938: 344), Robbins (1953: 105), Robbins (1971: 147)
s well as Robbins (1981: 1).
4 For example, Parsons (1934) critique of Robbins’s Essay com-
letely revolves around methodological issues, to the extent that
ilonakis and Fine (2009: 218) suggested that Parsons ‘‘(.  . .)
erceived Robbins as deﬁning a method and not a subject mat-
er’’ (italics in the original). In a similar line, Backhouse (1985:
68) explained that, in his Essay, Robbins was simply ‘‘(.  . .)  making
recise the nature of the already ﬁrmly established generalizations
f which economics consisted’’. Finally, Colander (2009) explicitly
rgued that Robbins’s deﬁnition ‘‘(.  . .)  reﬂected what he believed
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2retations  is  correct  cannot  be  dismissed  by  simply  stating
hat  the  latter  authors  misread  Robbins,  because  this  second
eading  of  his  deﬁnition  can  be  derived  from  the  message
nd  the  ideas  explained  in  the  Essay.5
The  popularity  and  the  approval  gained  by  Robbins’s
eﬁnition  are  also  indirect  signs  that  it  has  played  and
ontinues  to  play  a  key  role  in  shaping  the  modern  concep-
ion  of  economics.  Stronger  evidence  of  this  inﬂuence  can
e  found  in  the  writings  of  authors  who  explicitly  defend
he  view  that  this  deﬁnition  dismissed  the  conception  of
he  science  implied  by  the  old  designation  of  ‘‘political
conomy’’  and  instituted  a  new  one  under  the  label  of
‘economics’’.6 The  controversies  this  deﬁnition  immedi-
tely  raised  --  which  have  been  documented  by  Backhouse
nd  Medema  (2009a)  --  bear  testimony  to  the  change  in  the
onception  of  the  science  it  induced.  In  particular,  some  of
he  negative  reactions  to  Robbins’s  deﬁnition  are  evidence
f  the  inﬂuence  it  exerted  on  the  subsequent  conception
f  the  science:  Backhouse  and  Medema  (2009b:  225)  high-
ighted  that  this  deﬁnition  was  simultaneously  accused  of
eing  too  broad  (because  it  failed  to  divide  economics  from
ther  social  sciences)  and  too  narrow  (because  it  favoured
heory  against  empirical  analysis).  Several  decades  later,
t  was  Kirzner  (1976:  119--124)  who,  distanced  from  theseconomic science (. . .)  the ‘it’ being deﬁned was not inclusive of all
hat economists did in their role as economists (. . .)  [but] included
nly the economic science portion of what economists did’’ (438).
 few pages later, Colander concluded: ‘‘(.  . .)  in his deﬁnition of
conomics Robbins focused on constrained optimization’’ (441).
5 In some passages of the Essay Robbins’s assertions seem to imply
hat the main subject of the Essay is the method of economics. To
uote only three: ‘‘[this essay] seeks to arrive at precise notions
oncerning the subject matter of Economic Science and the nature
f the generalisations of which Economic Science consist’’ (xiv);
‘(.  . .)  in the main, my object has been to state, as simply as I
ould, propositions which are the common property of most mod-
rn economists’’ (xv); ‘‘It is the object of this essay to arrive at
onclusions which are based on the inspection of economic science
s it is’’ (72).
6 See Groenewegen (1991: 556) or Milonakis and Fine (2009,
specially pages 224--228). This view is more explicitly stated by
arcourt (1979: 243) who wrote ‘‘the great leap forward occurred,
vidently, when the discipline ceased to be political economy and
ecame economics (. . .)  which was favoured by Wicksteed and Rob-
ins’’. A similar idea is expressed in Hodgson (2001: 23, 33, 183,
07ss, 233) or Berstein (2003: 157).
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mA  New  View  on  Robbins’s  Deﬁnition  of  Economics:  the  Notio
of  the  science  it  entails,  which  results  from  its  ability  to
embrace  issues  that  had  not  been  considered  to  be  economic
on  the  basis  of  any  previous  deﬁnition  of  the  science;  and
its  ‘‘formalism’’,  i.e.  Robbins’s  emphasis  in  his  Essay  (30,
38)  that  economics  has  an  exclusive  interest  in  the  rela-
tion  between  means  and  ends  and  not  in  these  elements  in
themselves.
Note  that  the  two  implications  described  by  Kirzner
generated  two  opposite  trends  in  the  development  of  the
science.  On  the  one  hand,  by  failing  to  divide  economics
from  the  other  social  sciences,  the  breadth  of  Robbins’s
deﬁnition  favoured  an  enlargement  of  economists’  inter-
ests  in  the  study  of  other  topics.  In  fact,  various  authors
advance  this  view,  either  by  arguing  that  Robbins’s  deﬁ-
nition  made  the  subject-matter  of  the  science  essentially
unlimited  --  see,  Marciano  (2009:  128)  --  or  by  arguing  that
it  directly  stimulated  interest  among  economists  in  studying
new  types  of  (human  and  social)  phenomena  not  previously
considered  to  be  ‘‘economic’’  --  see  Scoon  (1943:  311).7
On  the  other  hand,  the  formalism  of  Robbins’s  deﬁnition,
by  narrowing  interest  in  the  economic  method,  resulted  in
economics  becoming  compartmentalized8 which,  in  turn,
isolated  economists  from  intellectual  interchange  with  other
social  scientists  and  in  practice  promoted  a  reduction  in  the
range  of  questions  that  economists  qua  economists  were
able  to  answer,  as  Deane  (1978:  147)  points  out.
However,  if  the  subsequent  evolution  of  the  science  is
examined,  the  particular  impact  that  these  two  contra-
dictory  trends  have  had  on  it  can  be  easily  recognized:
economists  have  increased  the  range  of  topics  studied9 but
have  simultaneously  reduced  the  interest  in  the  methods
used  to  analyze  them.  In  fact,  these  were  the  working  forces
in  economics  that  Coase  (1978:  207)  detected:
7 See also Harcourt (1979: 243) or Siegers (1992), who suggested
that Robbins’s deﬁnition at least favoured the expansion of eco-
nomics into other areas of research. Backhouse and Medema (2009a:
813) provided indirect evidence in favour of this view, since they
detected an association between the acceptance (or lack of discus-
sion) of Robbins’s deﬁnition among economists and the process of
expansion of the science beyond its traditional boundaries.
8 The literature also contains examples of writers who suggested
that Robbins’s deﬁnition isolates economics from proper intercourse
with other social sciences. For example, reading Souter’s (1933:
378--379) early critique of Robbins’s Essay, the reader is left with
the impression that the deﬁnition isolates economics from the other
social sciences. Similarly, Klappholz and Agassi (1959: 60--61) wrote
that Robbins was suggesting ‘‘(.  . .)  that there should be an a priori,
water-tight, separation between economics and other sciences’’.
These assessments are akin to Hodgson’s (2001: 210) conclusion
that Robbins ‘‘(.  . .)  attempt[ed] to deﬁne economics in terms of
the autonomous, deductive investigation of the relation between
scarce means and given ends’’. A similar view that Robbins intended
to separate economics from history and psychology can be found in
Maas (2009), or Sánchez-Robles (1994).
9 In this sense, it is easy to show that much of the work currently
done in modern (especially micro) economic theory deals with topics
that thirty or forty years ago would have been considered to be
outside the ﬁeld and, consequently, inaccessible to the tools and
the methods used by this science. These topics include the family,
suicide, religion, politics, law, and biology. See, for example, Ierulli
and Tommasi (1995, 1).
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a Real  and  Formal  Scarcity  85
‘‘There  are,  at  present,  two  tendencies  in  operation  in
economics  which  seem  to  be  inconsistent  but  which,  in
fact,  are  not.  The  ﬁrst  consists  of  the  enlargement  of  the
scope  of  economists’  interests  so  far  as  subject  matter
is  concerned.  The  second  is  a  narrowing  of  professional
interest  to  formal,  technical,  commonly  mathematical,
analysis.’’
By  simply  juxtaposing  Coase’s  texts  with  Kirzner’s  anal-
sis,  it  is  possible  to  trace  back  the  roots  of  the  two
endencies  identiﬁed  by  the  former  author  to  the  inﬂuence
f  Robbins  --  for  they  closely  resemble  the  characteristics
epicted  by  the  latter  author.  More  recently,  Backhouse  and
edema  (2009a:  805,  816)  explicitly  conﬁrmed  this  peculiar
nﬂuence,  for  they  recognized  that  Robbins’s  deﬁnition  both
arrowed  and  broadened  the  scope  of  economics:  it  nar-
owed  its  scope  by  suggesting  that  deduction  could  achieve
ore  than  many  economists  believed  it  could;  and  it  broad-
ned  its  range  by  freeing  economists  from  being  constrained
o  analysing  speciﬁc  subject-matter.  Thus,  Robbins’s
eﬁnition  may  have  favoured  a  very  special  type  of  interrela-
ionship  between  economics  and  the  other  (social)  sciences:
ne  that  positioned  economics  at  the  top  of  the  social  sci-
nces,  subordinating  them  to  the  methods  employed  by  the
ormer  -- e.g.  Hirshleifer  (1985),  Demsezt  (1997:  1).10
This  brief  review  of  the  inﬂuence  of  Robbins’s  deﬁnition
n  economic  science  provides  us  with  two  additional  themes
hat  deserve  exploration:  ﬁrstly,  the  reasons  why  this  deﬁ-
ition  has  had  these  two  different  effects  ----  to  the  best  of
y  knowledge  these  reasons  remain  unexplored,  despite  it
eing  well-accepted  that  the  two  effects  of  Robbins’s  deﬁ-
ition  moulded  economic  science;  secondly,  the  reason  why
hese  two  effects  led  to  the  particular  conﬁguration  of  the
cience  explained  in  the  preceding  paragraph.
To  provide  the  answers  to  the  three  questions  posed  in
he  introduction,  this  article  only  discusses  one  of  the  three
hemes  that  Robbins  considered  in  his  Essay  --  namely,  the
uestion  of  the  subject-matter  of  the  science  --  not  only
ecause  it  is  central  to  the  Essay 11but  also  because  the
olutions  to  the  questions  are  closely  related  to  this  theme,
s  shown  in  the  following.  In  order  to  make  the  exposition  as
lear  as  possible,  the  article  is  organized  as  follows.  The  next
ection  describes  some  long-standing  problems  related  to
nderstanding  the  subject-matter  of  the  science  that  were
10 Obviously, this is a very particular way of being interested in
or interacting with) neighbouring disciplines, and it is clearly not
he only possible one -- see, for example, Stillman (1955) or Ruttan
2007) on some possible alternative ways in which scientists or dis-
iplines can interact.
11 It is widely acknowledged that Robbins had at least three dif-
erent aims in mind when writing his Essay: one was related to
he deﬁnition of the object of the science and the other two were
elated to methodological issues -- see Corry (1987: 297), O’Brien
1988: 23) or Hands (2009). Although the question of the elucidation
f the subject-matter received comparatively less space in the Essay
han the other methodological issues, it occupied a central posi-
ion in his reasoning, since the resolution of these methodological
ssues follows from the correct identiﬁcation of the subject-matter
f economics, as can be inferred from what Robbins (1971: 146--147)
rote. Furthermore, this theme has received comparatively less
ttention in the literature.
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4--5). This  association  is  not  surprising  for,  as  Kirzner  (1976:
45)  pointed  out,  the  deﬁnitions  that  promoted  the  view
that  economics  deals  with  economic  welfare  can  be  consid-
ered  the  natural  successors  of  the  deﬁnitions  of  economics
Sir Dennis’s attempted rehabilitation of the ‘more material side of
human happiness’ as the best deﬁnition of the subject matter of
economics; and I am very surprised to ﬁnd it taking the place of
the Pigovian ‘accessibility to the measuring rod of money’, which,
if not the same thing as the deﬁnition in terms of scarcity which I6  
till  extant  when  Robbins  wrote  his  Essay. It  also  shows  that
hese  were  the  problems  that  puzzled  Robbins  with  regard
o  the  subject-matter  of  the  science.  Section  three  deals
ith  Robbins’s  solution,  which  involved  substituting  a  new
onception  of  the  subject-matter  for  the  previous  one.  This
ection  also  describes  some  confusion  that  surrounds  the
ay  Robbins  understood  the  new  subject-matter  and  which
lso  slid  into  his  deﬁnition.  To  escape  from  the  problems
enerated  by  Robbins’s  confusion,  this  section  concludes  by
roposing  a  more  precise  way  of  understanding  the  subject-
atter  of  economics  which,  in  turn,  results  in  a  new  way
f  understanding  his  deﬁnition  of  the  science.  The  following
wo  sections  present  arguments  that  support  the  solution
dvanced  at  the  end  of  section  three  by  showing  that  (i)
t  constitutes  the  correct  way  of  understanding  the  Rob-
insian  subject-matter  of  the  science,  (ii)  it  is  compatible
ith  the  ideas  that  Robbins  explained  in  his  writings,  and
iii)  more  importantly,  it  makes  his  writings  more  intelligible
ecause  it  clariﬁes  the  problems  he  had  introduced  into  the
cience.  Section  six  concludes  by  rounding  off  the  argument
nd  showing  that  my  suggested  interpretation  of  Robbins’s
eﬁnition  provides  the  answers  to  the  three  main  questions
osed  in  this  article.
. The longstanding problems of the deﬁnition
nd subject-matter of economics
t  the  beginning  of  the  opening  chapter  of  his  Essay, Rob-
ins  cited  some  (Anglo-Saxon)  deﬁnitions  of  the  science,
hich  can  be  grouped  into  two  different  categories:  def-
nitions  which  located  the  distinguishing  characteristic  of
he  subject-matter  in  the  materiality  of  the  means  used  in
conomic  activities12;  and  those  which  located  it  in  other
spects  of  these  activities,  such  as  the  presence  of  prices,
oney  or  exchange.13 Although  Robbins  disagreed  with  the
wo  types  of  deﬁnitions,  the  point  that  has  passed  unnoticed
p  to  now  is  that  his  objections  to  each  group  are  of  a very
ifferent  nature.  In  particular,  Robbins  did  not  consider  that
he  second  set  of  deﬁnitions  completely  misrepresented  the
ubject-matter,  but  that  they  simply  did  not  throw  the  max-
mum  light  on  the  ultimate  nature  of  economics  --  see  Essay
21n).14 Robbins  considered  this  to  be  a  minor  point  of  dis-
greement,  as  shown  by  the  following  well-known  passage:
12 The fact that Robbins did not consider the deﬁnitions he quoted
o be equivalent to each other is shown by the following: ‘‘(.  . .)  the
equel will show how widely the implications of these deﬁnitions
iverge from one another’’ [Essay (1n)]. Moreover, in his previous
esearch, Robbins had classiﬁed the existing deﬁnitions of the sci-
nce into four categories, two of them being those described in the
ext and a third being a category corresponding to his own deﬁni-
ion -- see Howson (2004: 423--424). The deﬁnitions quoted in the
ssay which fall within the ﬁrst category are Marshalls’s, Cannan’s
nd Beveridge -- see Essay (1n). Subsequently, Robbins also referred
o the deﬁnitions of Pareto and Clark Howson (2004: 4).
13 These are the deﬁnitions of Davenport and Pigou Howson (2004:
n). Subsequently, he also considered the deﬁnitions of Annon,
asky and Schumpeter Howson (2004: 17--21 and 21 n1).
14 Also see Robbins (1953: 104) where he even more clearly down-
layed the differences between his deﬁnition and those which
elong to the second group: ‘‘(.  . .)  I should ﬁnd it very hard to accept
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‘‘The  difference  between  this  and  other  deﬁnitions  now
current  is  not  a  very  serious  matter.  It  is  probable  that
those  who  do  not  ﬁnd  this  deﬁnition  acceptable  would
prefer  some  such  deﬁnition  as  that  of  Professor  Pigou
(.  . .) As  I  have  explained  elsewhere,  I myself  feel  that
this  suggest  an  unnecessary  restriction  of  the  subject
matter  of  economics  to  a  certain  institutional  setting.
But  this  is  a  very  minor  point  indeed. (.  .  .) Whether  we
deﬁne  the  actual  subject  matter  of  study  in  terms  which
cover  all  institutional  settings  (the  ‘‘scarcity’’  deﬁnition)
or  limit  it  to  those  settings  which  are  most  preoccupied
(the  ‘‘exchange’’  deﬁnition),  is  not  a  matter  about  which
sensible  people  will  waste  many  precious  moments’’
[Robbins  (1938:  344), emphasis  added].
Therefore,  if  Robbins  saw  no  serious  discrepancy  between
is  own  deﬁnition  and  those  belonging  to  the  second  group,
t  is  only  the  ﬁrst  type  of  deﬁnitions  --  the  so-called  materi-
listic  --  which  he  regarded  as  completely  failing  to  describe
he  ultimate  subject-matter  of  the  main  generalizations  of
conomics  (Essay: 4--5).  Thus,  it  is  only  these  materialistic
eﬁnitions  which  Robbins  entirely  rejected  in  his  Essay.
Looking  more  closely  at  the  group  of  deﬁnitions  that  Rob-
ins  rejected,  it  is  clear  that  they  can  be  put  under  the
ame  heading  only  if  material  welfare  is  made  equivalent
o  wealth,  which  Robbins  implicitly  did.15 This  is  a  conse-
uence  of  the  inﬂuence  exerted  by  Cannan  (1928:  1ss),16
ho  began  his  book  on  the  elements  of  economics  by  assum-
ng  in  the  ﬁrst  instance  that  wealth  was  the  subject  matter
f  the  science17 and,  in  the  process  of  deﬁning  this  term,
quated  wealth  with  material  welfare  --  see  Cannan  (1928:avour, differs from it only in a certain implied institutional restric-
ion. I hasten to add that I do not regard this as a major doctrinal
ifference’’ (emphasis added). This example clearly suggests that
olander (2009: 438) has not correctly understood Robbins’s posi-
ion: he was not downplaying his deﬁnition, as Colander suggests,
ut only downplaying the differences between his deﬁnition and
ome type of the existing deﬁnitions of the science. Consequently,
olander also misses the point when stating that the deﬁnition was
ot Robbins’s central concern of the Essay -- nevertheless, his posi-
ion is not completely incorrect, as will become clear at the end of
his article.
15 This extreme can be veriﬁed by looking at the texts quoted by
owson (2004: 423) or pages 9--11 in Robbins’s Essay.
16 It is well known that Cannan was Robbins’s professor during a
-year course he took on the Principles of Economics in the LSE, see
owson (2011: 81--82). Robbins (1971: 146) noted that Cannan’s
ook was the main textbook for this course and expressed his great
dmiration for this teacher -- see Robbins (1953: 105).
17 As shown in the following, although this was  an old-fashioned
ractice in economics, other authors of the same epoch as Can-
an still proceeded in a similar way-- see, for example, Keynes
1917/1986: 2).
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in  terms  of  wealth.  In  particular,  where  economic  welfare
is  understood  as  material  welfare,  the  notion  of  welfare
evinced  a  strong  body  of  continuity  with  that  of  mate-
rial  wealth  Kirzner  (1976:  46).  Consequently,  by  accepting
this  association,  Robbins  became  involved  in  a  set  of  long-
standing  disputes  on  the  subject-matter  of  economics  which
revolved  around  the  problems  he  detected  regarding  these
materialistic  deﬁnitions  and  which  he  wanted  to  eradicate.
In  this  sense,  the  rest  of  this  section  is  devoted  to  providing
details  of  this  extreme,  that  is,  that  the  roots  of  the  prob-
lems  detected  by  Robbins  in  the  materialistic  deﬁnitions  of
the  science  can  be  traced  back  to  the  classical  deﬁnitions
-- and,  therefore,  he  was  (intentionally  or  unintentionally)
trying  to  solve  longstanding  problems  in  economics.
2.1.  Wealth  as  the  subject-matter  of  the  science
As  Kirzner  (1976:  22--29)  clearly  explained,  the  existence
of  distinct  subject-matter  ripe  for  independent  investiga-
tion  was  accepted  by  economists  with  little  discussion  from
the  very  beginning  of  the  science.  Consequently,  the  deﬁ-
nitions  proposed  by  Adam  Smith  onwards  followed  a  similar
strategy:  the  science  was  deﬁned  as  the  study  of  (or  knowl-
edge  about)  subject-matter  which  was  taken  as  something
given  and  in  most  cases  was  synonymous  with  the  concept
of  wealth.18
Note  that  this  way  of  deﬁning  the  science  has  an  indirect
classiﬁcatory  effect  on  human  action:  if  economic  science
studies  wealth,  and  since  some  human  pursuits  do  not  pro-
duce  it,  only  those  activities  that  are  directed  towards  the
production  (or  distribution)  of  wealth  fall  under  the  scope
of  economics.  To  put  it  differently,  following  this  deeply-
rooted  practice  of  deﬁning  the  science,  human  behaviour
could  be  easily  divided  into  two  separate  domains  (economic
and  non-economic),  according  to  whether  the  actions  con-
sidered  were  conducive  to  the  production  (or  distribution)
of  wealth  --  see  Kirzner  (1976:  21,  118--119).
Although  Robbins  soon  started  to  question  whether
wealth  was  the  subject-matter  of  the  science  --  see  Howson
(2004:  419,  422,  423)  or  Howson  (2011:  130,  143)  --  it  was
not  until  he  had  taught  a  course  on  the  economics  of  war
that  he  became  completely  perplexed.  The  reasons  for  his
perplexity  are  obvious:  how  can  economics  have  anything  to
say  about  war,  when  it  is  obvious  that  making  war  is  exactly
the  opposite  of  creating  wealth?  If  the  subject-matter  of
economics  is  wealth  then  war  should  fall  outside  the  scope
of  the  science.19 Robbins  made  his  perplexity  clear  in  his
Essay,  where  he  wrote:
18 For example, Smith (1776/1994: 736) deﬁned political econ-
omy as the study ‘‘of the nature and causes of the wealth of
nations’’. Many other classical economists directly or indirectly
hold that ‘‘wealth’’ is the subject-matter of economics -- see
Malthus (1836/1986: 21), Stuart-Mill (1848/1987: 1--2), Cairness
(1873/1965:240--41), Say (1880/1964: 1), Senior (1836/1965:2), and
Clark (1894: vii--viii).
19 See Howson (2004: 425), Howson (2011: 143) or Robbins (1971:
146).
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‘‘(.  .  .) No  less  an  economist  than  Professor  Cannan  has
urged  that  the  political  economy  of  war  is  ‘a  contra-
diction  in  terms’,  apparently  on  the  ground  that,  since
Economics  is  concerned  with  the  causes  of  material  wel-
fare  and  since  war  is  not  a  cause  of  material  welfare,  war
cannot  be  a  part  of  the  subject-matter  of  economics.  (.  .  .)
It  is  a  curious  paradox  that  Professor  Cannan’s  pronounce-
ment  on  this  matter  should  occur  in  a  work  which,  more
than  any  other  published  in  our  language,  uses  the  appa-
ratus  of  economic  analysis  to  illuminate  many  of  the  most
urgent  and  the  most  intricate  problems  of  a community
organized  for  war  (.  . .)’’  (Essay, 7).
The  obvious  conclusion  is  that  wealth  misrepresents  the
ubject-matter  of  the  science  and  another  deﬁning  feature
ust  be  searched  for.  In  addition,  note  that  this  example
ighlights  the  fact  that  the  general  failure  of  these  wealth-
ype  deﬁnitions  is  precisely  that  they  classify  a  certain  set  of
ctivities  under  the  label  ‘‘economic’’  --  see  Howson  (2004:
26).  Furthermore,  the  example  indirectly  suggests  how  the
eﬁnition  of  the  science  could  be  improved:  it  should  indi-
ate  those  aspects  of  human  activity  which  are  in  general
igniﬁcant  to  the  economist  (Howson,  2004:  426).
.2.  What  does  wealth  consist  of?  The  inclusion  of
aterial  and  nonmaterial  utilities
he  strategy  adopted  by  classical  economists  to  deﬁne  the
cience  was  problematic,  because  the  resulting  deﬁnition
rovided  very  little  insight  into  its  subject-matter  and  only
ndicated  how  the  term  economics  had  been  used:  to  denote
tudies  whose  main  object  of  interest  is  ‘‘wealth’’.  To  put
t  differently,  this  kind  of  deﬁnition  is  similar  to  what  logi-
ians  call  a  nominal,  ‘‘word-thing’’,  lexical  deﬁnition,  that
s,  a deﬁnition  that  explains  ‘‘the  actual  way  in  which  some
ctual  word  has  been  used  by  some  actual  person’’  --  see
obinson  (1965:  35).20
According  to  the  foregoing  explanations,  the  deﬁnitions
nder  consideration  have  the  major  shortcoming  that  the
haracterization  of  the  science  has  to  be  postponed  until
he  subject-matter  is  understood.  Until  this  is  correctly
one  it  remains  unclear  what  the  science  addresses  and
he  deﬁnition  remains  incomplete.  Thus,  this  kind  of  deﬁ-
ition  requires  the  nature  of  ‘‘wealth’’  to  be  investigated.
t  should  be  emphasized  that  to  complete  the  deﬁnition  of
he  science,  such  research  should  not  aim  at  deﬁning  what
he  word  ‘‘wealth’’  means  --  to  provide  a  nominal  ‘‘word-
hing’’  deﬁnition  of  the  term  --  but  to  ascertain  what  the  true
ature  of  ‘‘wealth’’  is,  what  constitutes  ‘‘wealth’’  in  real-
ty,  which,  as  Robinson  explained,  is  a  very  different  activity
rom  making  deﬁnitions.21
20 Note that I am not claiming that they tried to produce a ‘‘word-
hing’’ lexical deﬁnition. In fact, they might have tried to produce a
‘thing-thing’’ deﬁnition (see note 21) of economics. The key issue
s that they actually failed to produce it because their deﬁnitions
ere limited to reporting what had been understood by economics
p to that time.
21 Using Robinson’s (1965: 149) terminology, they should not ask a
uestion about the word ‘‘wealth’’ but ask a question about the
hing ‘‘wealth’’. As the author points out, although both types of
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.2.1.  The  classical  disputes  over  the  nature  of  wealth
lthough  this  kind  of  research  was  undertaken  by  Adam
mith22 in  his  Wealth  of  Nations,  the  author  did  not  pro-
ide  a  clear  explanation  of  what  constitutes  ‘‘wealth’’
n  reality.  In  fact,  the  term  is  given  various  deﬁnitions
n  Smith’s  book.23 As  can  be  inferred  from  Cannan’s
1903:14--31)  explanations,  these  different  deﬁnitions  gave
ise  to  conﬂicting  conceptions  of  wealth,  which  is  where
he  distinction  between  productive  and  unproductive  labour
as  its  roots.  This  distinction  was  correctly  designated
y  Kirzner  (1976:30)  as  the  starting  point  of  a  last-
ng  debate  among  economists  on  whether  immaterial
‘utilities’’  should  be  included  under  the  heading  ‘‘wealth’’,
.e.  a  debate  on  the  deﬁnition  of  wealth.  The  problem
s  that,  although  authors  attempted  to  deﬁne  ‘‘wealth’’,
he  deﬁnitions  they  proposed  were  not  of  the  same
ature24.
On  the  one  hand,  some  authors  tried  to  offer  a  real  deﬁni-
ion  of  ‘‘wealth’’  (that  is,  if  this  kind  of  deﬁnition  exists,  see
ote  21)  by  inquiring  into  the  nature  of  the  subject-matter  of
conomics.  In  doing  so,  their  inquiries  inevitably  led  to  the
onclusion  that  actual  wealth  is  also  composed  of  nonma-
erial  goods  or  utilities  --  see,  for  example  Say  (1880/1964:
19--127)  and  Lauderdale  (1819:  56--57).  The  problem  is  that
he  inclusion  of  nonmaterial  goods  within  the  scope  of  eco-
omics  seems  to  be  difﬁcult  to  reconcile  with  its  scientiﬁc
haracter,  a  position  that  was  ﬁrmly  defended  by  (almost)  all
lassical  economists.  There  were  two  main  reasons  for  this:
uestions have been subsumed under the same name (deﬁnition) --
ee Robinson (1965: 12--16) -- they have different purposes. More-
ver, as Robinson (1965: 171--178) goes on to explain, the search for
nswers to the second type of question has included several kinds
f intellectual activities, which traditionally have been subsumed
nder the (false, according to Robinson) name of a ‘‘thing-thing’’
eﬁnition.
22 It is clear that Smith investigated the nature of real wealth -- e.g.
ee the passages where he criticizes the way that wealth is com-
only understood (Smith 1776/1994: 273, 371, 456ss). Even Robbins
1998: 128--129) described the work of Smith as ‘‘(.  . .)  the work of
 profound thinker anxious to discover the nature of things’’.
23 That Smith was not able to clarify the nature of wealth is shown
y the fact that Malthus (1836/1986: 33) held that, although The
ealth of Nations contained no formal deﬁnition of wealth, it is
lear that the author understood it as being ‘‘material objects’’.
owever, Smith deﬁned wealth at least in the following alterna-
ive ways: ‘‘power of purchasing labour’’ (1776/1994: 34), ‘‘the
xchangeable value of the annual produce of the land and labour
f the country’’ (1776/1994: lxii, 277, 367), and ‘‘the accumulate
roduce of the improvements of agriculture and manufactures’’
1776/1994: 754).
24 This explains why it was not possible to reach an agreement;
lthough all the authors believed that they were trying to do the
ame thing, this was not really the case. This kind of confusion
an even be found in works by the same author. For example, take
annan (1928: 1): he argued that the question ‘‘what is wealth?’’ is
xactly the same as ‘‘what is it most convenient to take as the
ubject-matter of economics?’’ [emphasis added]. On the other
and, Cannan (1903: 1) stated that ‘‘the ﬁrst problem that con-
ronts us is therefore the question of the nature of wealth that is
he subject of production and distribution’’. The ﬁrst kind of ques-
ion is a word-thing stipulative deﬁnition, whereas the second kind
f question is a thing-thing or real deﬁnition (see note 21 and the
ext below).
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i)  it  introduced  some  vague  elements  into  the  language  and
oncepts  of  economics  (i.e.  what  is  meant  by  an  increase
r  decrease  in  wealth);  and  consequently,  (ii)  they  made  it
ore  difﬁcult  to  study  the  causes  of  the  wealth  of  nations
nd  to  measure  the  changes  in  the  wealth  of  a  person  or  a
ountry  in  empirical  studies.  Even  worse,  the  limits  of  the
cience  became  blurred,  because  in  this  case  the  science  of
ealth  would  have  to  cover  subject-matter  from  other  sci-
nces,  and  these  kinds  of  deﬁnitions  were  accused  of  being
oo  wide  --  on  this  point,  see  Malthus  (1836/1986:  23), and
cCulloch’s  criticisms  of  Lauderdale’s  deﬁnition  of  wealth
n  Kirzner  (1976:  30--31).
On  the  other  hand,  other  classical  economists  who  were
ware  of  these  problems  lost  sight  of  the  need  to  investi-
ate  the  nature  of  ‘‘wealth’’  in  order  to  bring  to  a  close
he  issue  of  deﬁnition  of  the  science,  and  centred  their
ttention  on  preserving  the  scientiﬁc  character  of  their
tudies.  Given  the  need  to  eliminate  ambiguity  from  con-
epts  in  order  to  successfully  pursue  science,  the  deﬁnition
f  wealth  and  other  elements  had  to  be  as  accurate  as
ossible.  As  Robinson  (1965:  68--69)  explained,  this  had
o  be  done  by  stipulating  what  it  was  going  to  be  under-
tood  by  ‘‘wealth’’.25 Thus,  these  deﬁnitions  of  wealth
ere  not  the  same  kind  as  those  of  the  previous  group,  for
hey  were  nominal,  not  real,  deﬁnitions.  In  this  sense,  the
uthors  who  adopted  this  strategy  usually  agreed  on  reserv-
ng  the  term  ‘‘wealth’’  to  mean  ‘‘material  products’’  --  see
althus  (1827/1986:  234;  1836/1986:  33--34)  and  Stuart-Mill
1848/1987:  9  and  48).  The  adoption  of  this  convention  had
t  least  one  major  advantage:  it  made  the  development
f  the  science  possible  because,  by  removing  the  ambi-
uity  introduced  by  real  deﬁnitions,  it  established  precise
anguage  and  made  it  possible  to  accurately  measure  the
hanges  in  the  wealth  of  a  country,  both  of  which  are  nec-
ssary  conditions  for  economics  to  be  a  science,  as  we  have
een.
The  outcome  of  these  two  alternative  ways  of  deﬁn-
ng  (and  understanding)  ‘‘wealth’’  was  a  series  of  disputes
etween  the  two  groups  of  authors.  The  reasons  offered
y  some  authors  of  the  ﬁrst  group  in  support  of  their
iew  that  wealth  should  also  include  non-material  utilities
nticipated  some  of  the  problems  that  Robbins  would  subse-
uently  encounter  in  accepting  the  materialistic  deﬁnitions
f  the  science.  For  example,  Say  (1880/1964:  120)  consid-
red  that  the  fruits  of  the  labour  of  physicians,  singers,
usicians,  lawyers,  etc.,  were  as  real  as  the  products  of
he  manufacturer,  as  was  testiﬁed  by  the  fact  that  prices
ere  paid  for  their  services  as  well  as  by  the  fortunes
ome  of  them  acquired  --  hence,  they  were  the  object
f  economic  inquiry.  Similarly,  authors  such  as  M’Culloch
onsidered  that  the  division  between  material  and  immate-
ial  implied  by  the  Smithian  distinction  between  productive
nd  unproductive  labour  was  ﬁctitious  and  that  it  was  not
25 This does not mean that they deﬁned wealth in a completely
rbitrary way, that is, without taking into any consideration the
eal attributes of wealth, but that they artiﬁcially introduced limits
y focusing their attention on some characteristics of real wealth,
enerally for the sake of clarity either in the language used or in the
cientiﬁc concepts developed [see Stuart-Mill (1848/1987: 46--53),
althus (1827/1986: 4; 1836/1986:21--23 and ss.)].
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the  classical  discussions  about  whether  economic  analysis
should  include  immaterial  utilities.  It  is  not  only  that  scarcity
also  affects  nonmaterial  means,  like  time  or  other  people’s
26 It also resolves the logical difﬁculty that leads to the conclusion
that if war is not part of the subject-matter of economics, thereA  New  View  on  Robbins’s  Deﬁnition  of  Economics:  the  Notio
possible  to  draw  this  division  in  relation  to  human  effort
--  see  Cannan  (1903/2005:  26--30).  Although  these  disputes
were  gradually  abandoned  as  new  conceptions  of  economic
issues  arose,  the  old  deﬁnitions  of  economics  as  a  science
of  (material)  wealth  continued  to  occupy  a  central  place
in  economic  thought  --  see  Kirzner  (1976:  41).  Hence,  the
problems  associated  with  this  conception  of  the  science  still
survived.
2.2.2.  Robbins’s  difﬁculties  with  equating  wealth  with
material  utilities
As  shown  at  the  beginning  of  this  section,  due  to  the  educa-
tion  he  received,  the  starting  point  of  Robbins’s  analysis  was
the  acceptance  of  the  materialistic  deﬁnitions,  i.e.  those
that  equated  wealth  with  material  products.  Thus,  it  is  not
surprising  that  the  deﬁciencies  Robbins  found  were  closely
related  to  the  issues  debated  by  the  classical  economists
outlined  above.  In  the  ﬁrst  place,  Robbins  had  difﬁculties
in  accepting  the  Smithian  division  between  productive  and
unproductive  labour  Howson  (2004:  425)  --  which  was  the
source  of  all  the  debates  summarized  in  Section  2.2.1  --
because  he  considered  this  division  to  be  misleading,  as
Howson  (2011:  130)  indicates.  In  fact,  the  ﬁrst  chapter  of
the  Essay  (7--9)  shows  that  Robbins  found  it  contradictory
the  position  of  the  contemporary  authors  who  rejected  the
Smithian  distinction  of  productive  and  unproductive  labour,
but  who  still  argued  that  the  subject-matter  of  economics
was  material  welfare:  if  the  labour  of  opera  singers  and
dancers  is  regarded  as  productive,  it  cannot  be  productive
of  something  material.  As  long  as  economics  is  concerned
with  the  pricing  of  these  services,  it  is  not  concerned  with
something  that  is  material.  The  same  idea  is  expounded  a
few  pages  before  in  the  Essay  (5--6)  by  means  of  the  example
of  the  theory  of  wages:  as  it  was  widely  accepted  that  the
theory  of  wages  was  a  part  of  economic  analysis,  Robbins
showed  that  if  the  ultimate  subject-matter  of  economics
were  material  wealth,  a  large  proportion  of  this  body  of
knowledge  would  lie  outside  the  scope  of  the  science  and  the
entire  process  of  general  analysis  could  never  be  employed,
as  it  was  in  fact  employed.
The  second  problem  is  more  subtle  because  it  is  more
philosophical  in  nature  and  thus  is  only  mentioned  in  pass-
ing  in  the  Essay  (11,  n1).  Recall  that,  as  shown  in  Section
2.2.1,  the  meaning  of  the  term  ‘‘material’’  was  adopted
by  the  second  group  of  classical  economists  mainly  to
facilitate  the  scientiﬁc  character  of  their  studies.  As  a  con-
sequence,  the  restrictions  that  this  convention  imposes  on
the  subject-matter  are  found  to  be  arbitrary  as  soon  as  they
are  subjected  to  scrutiny,  because  the  welfare  derived  from
human  actions  cannot  be  completely  sorted  into  material  or
immaterial  welfare  (since  it  is  a  mixture  of  both):  ‘‘Material
welfare  seems  to  involve  a  division  of  states  of  mind  which
are  essentially  unitary.’’  Robbins  wrote  (ibid.)  The  same  idea
is  developed  in  greater  detail  in  the  notes  Robbins  prepared
for  eight  lectures  on  Unsettled  Problems  in  Theoretical  Eco-
nomics  in  Oxford,  where  Robbins  expressed  two  difﬁculties
with  the  word  ‘‘material’’:‘‘(a)  In  the  ﬁrst  place  the  word  material  seems  to  be  dis-
placed.  It  is  not  the  satisfactions  which  are  material  but
the  means  of  satisfaction  (.  .  .) (b)  tenable  though  the  dis-
tinction  may  be  in  extreme  cases  it  does  not  seem  to  me
s
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to  be  a  useful  one  so  far  as  the  majority  of  the  satis-
factions  of  daily  life  are  concerned.  These  seem  to  me
to  lie  in  a  middle  area  (.  . .) I  eat  a  plate  of  porridge.
Perhaps  that  is  a  material  satisfaction.  As  the  bottom  of
the  plate  emerges  I  enjoy  the  pattern  of  the  porcelain.
Is  that  material  or  immaterial  and  supposing  the  latter
--  then  is  the  production  of  plain  plates  the  concern  of
economics  &  the  production  of  ornamental  the  concern
of  some  other  study?’’  Howson  (2004:  424,  19n).
Summing  up,  the  practical  difﬁculties  involved  in  cor-
ectly  identifying  the  scope  of  the  existing  theoretical
tructures  of  the  science  and  the  deeper  philosophical
mpediments  Robbins  found  in  equating  economic  wealth
ith  material  wealth  are  both  related  to  the  arguments
hat  appeared  in  the  classical  debates  on  the  nature  of
ealth.
.  The concept of scarcity in Robbins: the
roblems  it solves and the difﬁculties it
enerates
he  discomfort  caused  by  his  problems  with  the  existing  def-
nitions  of  economics  prompted  Robbins  to  break  with  the
old)  tradition  of  taking  it  for  granted  that  wealth  (or  mate-
ial  welfare)  was  the  subject-matter  of  the  science  and  to
ook  for  another  factor  that  better  characterized  economic
ctivity.  This  is  precisely  the  issue  that  occupies  the  sec-
nd  part  of  the  initial  chapter  of  Robbins’s  Essay  where,
mmediately  after  condemning  the  materialist  deﬁnitions,
e  introduced  the  common  factor  that  characterizes  eco-
omic  phenomena,  that  is:  ‘‘(.  .  .) the  scarcity  of  means  to
atisfy  ends  (.  .  .)’’  (Essay, 15)  --  see  also  Robbins  (1971:  146).
s  soon  as  this  factor  is  used  to  understand  the  problems
escribed  in  the  preceding  section,  the  beneﬁts  of  substi-
uting  wealth  by  scarcity  become  apparent.
Firstly,  it  solves  the  immediate  problem  of  including  war
n  the  ﬁeld  of  economics:  ‘‘(.  .  .) The  waging  of  war  neces-
arily  involves  the  withdrawal  of  scarce  goods  and  services
rom  other  uses  (.  .  .) It  has  therefore  an  economic  aspect’’
Essay,  16).26 More  generally,  it  breaks  with  the  arbitrary
lassiﬁcation  of  human  behaviour  implicitly  introduced  by
he  wealth-type  deﬁnitions  of  the  science  and  directs  atten-
ion  only  to  the  aspect  of  human  activity  that  is  signiﬁcant
o  the  economist  (Essay, 17),27 which  was  the  direction  in
hich  Robbins  thought  the  deﬁnition  of  economics  should  be
mproved.
Secondly,  by  identifying  scarcity  as  a  key  element  of
he  subject-matter  of  the  science,  Robbins  also  eliminated
he  problems  generated  by  associating  wealth  with  material
oods  or  means;  thus,  this  approach  deﬁnitively  resolvedhould be no production during war -- see Essay (48, n2).
27 See also Robbins (1946: xxii). Corry (1987: 207) also considered
hat this is the main consequence of Robbins’s substitution of wealth
y scarcity.
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itation  in  supply  plus  the  existence  of  alternative  uses,31
there  are  other  passages  which  clearly  indicate  that  Rob-
bins  equates  scarcity  with  a  mere  limitation  in  supply.32
28 See, for example, Essay (78): ‘‘(.  . .)  the chief of these postulates
are all assumptions involving in some way simple and indisputable
facts of experience relating to the way in which the scarcity of
goods which is the subject matter of the science (. . .)’’ [emphasis
added]; or Robbins (1971: 146) ‘‘(.  . .)  the underlying factor which
made so many different activities and relationships susceptible to
economic analysis was the scarcity of the means with which they
were concerned’’ -- see also Howson (2004: 427).
29 See Essay (46): ‘‘Economics, we have seen, is concerned with
that aspect of behaviour which arises from the scarcity (. . .)’’. Sim-
ilar pronouncements can be found in the other pages of the Essay:
14, 15, 16, 17, 24, 28, 46. Additionally, the sentences in Robbins
(1971: 146) or Robbins (1981: 1) place behaviour as the subject-
matter of the science. Finally, human behaviour also appears as the
subject-matter of the science in the notes quoted by Howson (2004:
426).
30 The idea that the problems dealt with by economics takes
diverse forms is implicitly stated in Essay (2--3, 15, 46 n, 49, 150).
Some examples of these forms can be found in Robbins (1934b: 90)
and the notes cited by Howson (2011: 659).
31 See the notes quoted in Howson (2004: 426) or Howson (2011:
175). In addition, the meaning of the concept of scarcity that
emerges from Howson’s (2011: 213) brief summary of the Essay also
reveals that Robbins implicitly suggested in at least some passages
of his book that scarcity requires the presence of alternative uses0  
ervices, but  also  that  it  is  a  quality  which  entirely  depends
n  the  relationship  of  these  means  or  goods  to  valuations
Essay,  21--22,  46).  In  this  sense,  this  factor  explains  why  the
heory  of  wages  is  an  integral  part  of  any  system  of  economic
nalysis  --  see  Essay  (16)  --  and  also  makes  it  possible  to
nderstand  why  economic  analysis  can  be  applied  either  to
 community  of  sybarites  or  a  community  of  ascetics  (Essay,
4--26).
Moreover,  the  characterization  of  the  subject-matter  of
conomics  in  terms  of  scarcity  is  superior  to  its  previous
haracterization  in  terms  of  material  wealth  because  the
atter  can  be  subsumed  into  the  former.  This  point  was
learly  seen  by  Robbins  in  the  Essay  (47--48),  where  he
tates  that  ‘‘(.  .  .) wealth  is  not  wealth  because  of  its  sub-
tantial  qualities.  It  is  wealth  because  it  is  scarce’’.  Given
hat  scarcity  is  a  relative  concept  because  it  depends  upon
aluations,  wealth  is  also  relative:  when  valuations  change,
hat  constitutes  wealth  also  changes.  An  illustrative  exam-
le  of  this  is  the  production  of  war  machines  after  the
rmistice  was  signed:  ‘‘(..)  what  at  10.55  a.m.  that  morn-
ng  was  wealth  and  productive  power,  at  11.5  had  become
not-wealth’,  an  embarrassment,  a  source  of  social  waste.
he  substance  had  not  changed  (.  .  .) The  ends  had  changed.
he  scarcity  of  means  was  different’’  (Essay, 48).
The  amount  and  relevance  of  the  problems  solved  con-
inced  Robbins  that  economic  phenomena  were  associated
ith  the  appearance  of  scarcity  and  that  other  factors,  like
he  existence  of  an  exchange  relationship,  were  a  technical
ncident  subsidiary  to  it  (Essay, 20).  Note  that  it  is  in  this
ubstitution  of  wealth  by  scarcity  that  Robbins  advocates
here  part  of  the  breadth  of  his  deﬁnition  has  its  roots.
his  replacement  forced  a  change  in  the  way  this  subject-
atter  should  be  conceived:  instead  of  thinking  of  it  as
nvolving  some  types  of  human  behaviour,  Robbins  showed
hat  it  should  be  conceived  as  involving  an  aspect  of  all
uman  behaviour  --  see  Essay  (16--17)  or  Robbins  (1981:  2).  In
iew  of  the  problems  this  substitution  solved  it  is  clear  that
obbins  was  correct  in  defending  the  modiﬁcation  of  the
ubject-matter  of  the  science.  This  change  not  only  breaks
ith  the  false  limits  imposed  by  the  wealth-type  deﬁnitions
n  the  subject-matter,  it  also  widens  the  scope  of  the  sci-
nce,  making  it  clear  that  some  activities  which  were  not
reviously  considered  economic  actually  had  an  economic
spect.  This  explains  why  some  early  reactions  to  Robbins’s
eﬁnition  were  that  it  was  too  wide,  which  closely  resem-
led  the  criticisms  raised  against  the  classical  deﬁnitions  of
ealth  that  included  non-material  utilities,  as  we  saw  in
ection  2.2.1.  However,  it  does  not  follow  from  this  substi-
ution  that  all  human  behaviour  is  economic,  or  that  it  can
e  reduced  to  economic  terms  such  that  it  can  be  studied
nly  with  the  economic  method.  For  this  to  be  the  case,  at
east  one  additional  theoretical  step  must  be  taken,  as  we
ill  see.
.1.  The  problematic  status  of  scarcity  in
obbins’s writingslthough  the  central  position  of  scarcity  in  Robbins’s  concep-
ion  of  the  subject-matter  is  unquestionable,  the  true  status
f  scarcity  is  ambiguous  in  practice.  The  ﬁrst  issue  to  ascer-
ain  is  whether  Robbins  thought  that  scarcity  was  the  actual
f
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ubject-matter  of  economics  or  whether  it  was  merely  a  key
ondition.  Although  a few  passages28 suggest  that  Robbins
quated  scarcity  with  the  subject-matter,  his  well-known
eﬁnition  of  the  science  suggests  a  different  view:
‘‘Economics  is  the  science  which  studies  human
behaviour  as  a  relationship  between  ends  and  scarce
means  which  have  alternative  uses’’  (Essay, 16).
A  glance  at  the  text  immediately  reveals  that  it  is  human
ehaviour,  and  not  scarcity,  which  is  depicted  as  the  subject-
atter  of  economics.  In  fact,  there  are  many  other  examples
oth  in  the  Essay  and  in  other  related  sources  where  Robbins
xplicitly  states  that  it  is  human  behaviour  (and  not  scarcity
irectly)  that  economics  studies.29 Despite  his  lack  of  clar-
ty,  a  review  of  his  writings  suggests  that  Robbins  considered
hat  economics  does  not  directly  deal  with  scarcity,  but  with
uman  behaviour  as  affected  by  this  factor.  The  inﬂuence  of
carcity  generates  economic  problems  [see  Robbins  (1939:
16--117)],  which  come  in  many  different  forms  due  to
he  various  and  changing  manifestations  of  scarcity  (Essay,
17).30 However,  since  all  of  the  problems  are  caused  by
he  same  factor  (scarcity),  this  is  exactly  the  element  that
nites  the  problems  considered  by  economic  science  (Essay
--3,  15).
The  second  issue  is  whether  the  concept  of  scarcity  alone
ufﬁces  to  completely  characterize  an  economic  problem.
his  is  a  more  difﬁcult  question  to  answer  as  it  depends  on
larifying  what  Robbins  understood  by  scarcity,  something
hich  is  far  from  clear.  Although  some  passages  suggest  that
obbins  considered  scarcity  to  be  the  combination  of  lim-or the means.
32 See Essay (20, note 3): ‘‘In a social economy (. . .)  the mere mul-
iplicity of economic subjects leads to overlook the possibility of the
xistence of scarce goods with no alternative uses’’. In Essay (36,
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This  ambivalent  conception  of  scarcity  may  help  to  explain
why  in  some  places  in  the  text  Robbins  argued  that  the
mere  presence  of  scarcity  sufﬁces  to  completely  character-
ize  an  economic  problem33 (in  order  to  make  sense,  scarcity
must  here  be  understood  in  the  ﬁrst  sense  of  the  term),
whereas  in  other  places  he  suggested  that  scarcity  alone
does  not  generate  an  economic  problem34 (to  make  sense,
scarcity  must  now  be  understood  as  a  mere  limitation  in  sup-
ply).  Clearly,  this  indeterminacy  in  Robbins’s  writings  (and
thought)  makes  it  impossible  to  determine  the  true  content
of  actual  scarcity,  which  subsequently  impedes  resolving  the
issue  of  whether  it  alone  can  give  rise  to  an  economic  prob-
lem.
However,  the  issue  becomes  even  more  complicated,
for  in  the  pages  of  the  Essay  (12--14)  where  Robbins
characterized  in  detail  the  elements  that  make  up  the  eco-
nomic  aspect  of  human  behaviour,  he  introduced  a  new
compulsory  factor:  the  existence  of  multiple  (and  hierar-
chically  ordered)  ends.35 The  problem  is  that  throughout  his
works  Robbins  alternates  between  characterizing  scarcity  in
terms  of  the  ‘‘multiplicity  of  ends’’  and  in  terms  of  the
‘‘alternative  uses’’  of  the  means.36 In  doing  so,  he  subtly
associated  both  notions  and,  consequently,  reduced  to  only
two  the  conditions  for  the  emergence  of  an  economic  prob-
lem  in  practice  --  the  other  one  being,  as  we  have  seen,  the
46) and Robbins (1971: 146) scarcity is characterized in the same
lines. This second interpretation implies a conception of scarcity
very similar to that of Senior (1836/1965: 7--8, 11--13), Menger
(1994, 94ss) or Bronfenbrenner (1962), which is more in accordance
with its usual meaning. Finally, it is worth noting that this is also the
meaning some authors attach to the term ‘‘scarcity’’ in Robbins --
e. g. Sowel (2004: 2--3).
33 See, for example Essay (24): ‘‘In so far as the achievement of any
end is dependent on scarce means it is germane to the preoccupa-
tions of the economist’’. The same idea is also expressed in different
terms in Essay (17, 28, 38), Robbins (1971: 146), and Robbins (1981:
1, 9). See also the notes summarized by Howson (2011: 659) in which
the scarcity of goods is equated with the nature of the economic
problem.
34 See Essay (13): ‘‘Nor is the mere limitation of means by itself
sufﬁcient to give rise to economic phenomena. If means of satis-
faction have no alternative use, then they may be scarce but, they
cannot be economized’’.
35 According to the explanations that appear in these pages,
although four elements are required to completely characterize an
economic problem -- that is, limitation of means, alternative uses,
multiplicity of ends, and hierarchical ranking of the ends -- it is clear
that the last two can be subsumed into just one, for both refer to
the same category (ends) and both are necessary for the emergence
of economic phenomena -- see Essay (75--76). In fact, the existence
of a hierarchy of ends is a reﬁnement introduced by Robbins in the
second edition of his Essay (14, note 2).
36 The characterizations of scarcity in terms of ‘‘multiplicity of
ends’’ can be found in the Essay (15, 24, 42n, 46, 88 138) as well
as in Robbins (1934b: 90), Robbins (1938: 344), Robbins (1979: 997),
Robbins (1981: 2) and Howson (2011: 173). The characterization of
scarcity in terms of ‘‘alternative uses’’ (or, equivalently, in terms of
‘‘alternative application’’) can be found in the Essay (12, 14, 16, 26,
83) as well as in Howson (2011: 214). Additionally, the fact that many
authors understand that Robbins is deﬁning economics in terms of
(multiple) ends and scarce means highlights the existence of this
confusion -- see, for example Drakopoulous (2011: 467), Milonakis
and Fine (2009: 224), or Hodgson (2001: 208).
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imitation  of  means.  This  mixing  of  concepts  is  also  evident
n  other  parts  of  the  Essay, where  intermediate  notions  were
sed  by  Robbins  to  characterize  scarcity.37 This  association
etween  ‘‘alternative  uses’’  and  ‘‘multiplicity  of  ends’’  was
etected  by  Souter  (1933:  380), who  additionally  denounced
t  as  being  illicit  and  insisted  on  keeping  both  concepts  sep-
rate  Souter  (1933:  382).  Clearly,  Souter  is  right  in  keeping
he  concepts  of  ‘‘plurality  of  ends’’  and  ‘‘alternative  uses’’
eparate,  since  ‘‘ends  of  behaviour’’  are  not  the  same  as
‘uses  of  means’’.38 But  then,  the  more  fundamental  ques-
ion  arises  of  which  one  of  these  two  elements  is  the  true
eterminant  of  scarcity  in  practice  --  and,  therefore,  of  the
mergence  of  an  economic  problem.
.2.  Is  scarcity  a  consequence  of  the  presence  of
‘alternative  uses’’  or  ‘‘multiplicity  of  ends’’?
n  the  following  I  am  going  to  expand  on  the  issue  of  why
carcity  in  practice  cannot  be  determined  by  the  number  of
bjectives  that  the  actor  has  in  mind  when  performing  an
ction  or  taking  a  decision.  This  will  immediately  imply  that
he  presence  of  ‘‘plurality  of  ends’’  cannot  be  an  element
hat  demarcates  the  subject-matter  of  the  science.
Note,  in  the  ﬁrst  instance,  that  if  the  number  of  objec-
ives  considered  by  the  individual  were  a  factor  that
etermined  whether  his  or  her  behaviour  was  inﬂuenced
y  scarcity  or  not,  the  subject-matter  of  the  science  would
37 At least the following ‘‘compounded’’ concepts appear in the
ssay: ‘‘desired alternatives’’ (17), ‘‘valuation of alternative oppor-
unities’’ (69 n) or ‘‘hierarchy of alternatives’’ (99).
38 This is not the place to fully elaborate this point, but I will at
east offer some suggestions concerning the distinction between
he notions of ‘‘multiple ends’’ and ‘‘alternative uses’’. On the
ne hand, the very notions of ‘‘ends’’ and ‘‘means’’ refer to dif-
erent features of human behaviour. Ends are, as Knight (1999: 8)
xplains, ‘‘whatever the individual strives to do or to get’’ with
is action -- i.e. what it is aimed at when performing an action. In
his sense, ends are completely chosen by the agent, and so they
re subjective. On the contrary, the ‘‘use’’ of a means is the way
t is employed to reach some desired goal -- or, more formally, the
ntegration of a given means into the process of human action. Uses
f means are partially determined by the objective characteristics
f the instrument which is being employed -- since it is normally
esigned to facilitate the achievement of a certain goal -- and, con-
equently, are not completely chosen by the agent. For example,
 hammer and a nail can be used to hang a painting on the wall,
ut not to paint it. On the other hand, the quality of being alterna-
ive is more stringent than the quality of being multiple or plural.
bviously, the former requires of the latter in that, for uses of a
iven means to be alternative, there must be at least two (i.e. a plu-
ality) of them. But ‘‘alternativeness’’ additionally precludes any
orm of ‘‘simultaneity’’ in the use, which is something not impeded
y ‘‘plurality’’. In this sense, a single action can serve to achieve
ore than one goal. For example, one can perform a job to earn a
iving and, simultaneously, to help others or enjoy oneself -- so this
ctivity is both intrinsically and extrinsically rewarding, see Dyke
1981: 11). As I will explain in the main text, the uses of the means
re alternative in at least two basic senses: (i) a social one, which
tems from the quality of rivalry in consumption -- see Section 3.2
nd (ii) a temporal one, which stems from the fact that the same
articular amount of a given means cannot be used at two different
oments of time -- see Section 4.
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e  subjectively  determined,  because  the  ends  of  action  are
hosen  by  the  individual  --  see  Mises  (1996:  12)  or  Parsons
1934:  513--515).  In  addition,  since  our  objectives  of  action
re  essentially  mental  or  immaterial  (Robbins,  1953:  106)
hey  are  not  observable  (Essay, 90),  so  their  number  is
nknown  to  the  external  observer.  Therefore,  it  would  be
mpossible  to  objectively  determine  if  a  given  action  has  an
conomic  aspect,  for  this  would  require  (of  that  impartial
bserver)  knowing  the  number  of  objectives  that  the  actor
ook  into  account  at  the  moment  of  choice  --  or,  at  least,  that
his  number  is  greater  than  one.39 Moreover,  the  inﬂuence
f  scarcity  on  human  behaviour  could  be  determined  at  will,
or  the  agent  could  easily  eliminate  it  (and  the  problems  it
aises)  by  simply  disregarding  all  the  ends  of  action  except
or  one  and  aiming  for  this  objective  alone.  Hence,  as  long
s  scarcity  is  an  objective  attribute  of  human  behaviour,  it
annot  depend  on  factors  that  can  be  subjectively  modiﬁed
y  the  chooser,  as  is  the  case  of  ‘‘multiplicity  of  ends’’.40
Secondly,  the  existence  of  alternative  uses  for  a  means
oes  not  depend  on  factors  that  can  be  subjectively  mod-
ﬁed,  and  thus  it  constitutes  a  factor  that  objectively
etermines  the  emergence  of  economic  problems.  This  can
e  easily  seen  by  considering  the  case  of  an  agent  living
n  society:  the  uses  of  a  given  means  are  not  only  deter-
ined  by  the  different  ends  pursued  by  an  arbitrary  user,
ut  also  by  the  existence  of  different  potential  users  that
an  employ  the  same  means  to  reach  their  (possibly  identi-
al)  ends,  as  pointed  out  by  Rivett  (1955:  216).41 Clearly,  this
39 Then, viewed from the outside, the same action could fall within
r outside the scope of the science and it would not possible to con-
lude that, for example, buying a car is an economic action unless
ne could be sure that the buyer had more than on goal in mind
hen performed it. What the procedure suggested by Robbins could
how, at most, is whether the agent’s motive for action was eco-
omic or not -- as Robbins (1939: 117) himself suggests -- which is a
ery different issue to ascertaining whether the agent’s activity had
een inﬂuenced by scarcity. Hence, as Crespo (2013: 764) explains,
ne thing is whether human behaviour has an economic aspect or
ot, and another different one is whether the actor attempts to act
conomically or not.
40 In addition, if multiple ends were a necessary element for
carcity to appear, the other subjective factor related to them
e.g., the existence of a consistent hierarchy of ends) would also be
equired for the emergence of economic problems. However, Rob-
ins considered that the inﬂuence of scarcity does not depend on
he consistency of ends: see Essay (91--93), Robbins (1934b: 101),
obbins (1979: 998) or Robbins (1981: 2). Furthermore, the idea that
he inﬂuence of scarcity on human behaviour is independent of sub-
ective factors is implied in Essay (30, 152, 156) and Robbins (1934b;
0), where the obligation to choose (see Section 4) is stated. Apart
rom these theoretical reasons, the argument advanced by Noorgard
1990) that resources may be scarce even if people are not aware
f this fact shows that the inﬂuence of scarcity on human behaviour
s actually independent of factors that can be subjectively modiﬁed
y the chooser.
41 In other words, when humans live in society alternative uses of a
iven means appear simply because (i) there are many people who
an employ the same means, even though all of them want it for
he same purpose, (ii) the use of a quantity of a means by a person
mpedes the use of this quantity of a means by others. However,
ote that (ii) corresponds to the notion of rivalry in consumption
see Peston (1972:12--14)]. It should be taken into account that, as
oldvary (1994:12--13) explains, there exist more types of rivalry
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s  the  quality  of  scarcity  that  Robbins  explicitly  emphasized
hen  he  wrote  that  scarcity  denotes  ‘‘(.  .  .) limitation  with
espect  to  demand.  Good  eggs  are  scarce  because,  having
egard  to  the  demand  for  them,  there  are  not  enough  to  go
ound’’  --  Essay  (46).  However,  Robbins  failed  to  note  that
his  example  reveals  that  a  multiplicity  of  ends  is  not  a  requi-
ite  for  scarcity,  since  in  this  case  it  affects  human  behaviour
ven  if  all  consumers  want  eggs  for  the  similar  (and  unique)
urpose  of  eating  them  --  which,  on  the  other  hand,  is  what
appens  under  normal  circumstances.42 In  more  technical
erms,  good  eggs  are  scarce  because  they  are  rivals  in  con-
umption  (see  note  41).  Furthermore,  if  the  property  of
ivalry  is  considered,  it  is  even  clearer  that  ‘‘multiplicity  of
nds’’  cannot  be  a  condition  for  the  emergence  of  scarcity,
ecause,  even  if  ends  are  multiple,  the  problem  of  scarcity
oes  not  arise  when  means  are  not  in  rivalry,  as  is  the  case  of
 typical  public  good,  such  as  a  lighthouse.  Summing  up,  the
uality  of  rivalry  in  consumption,  which  is  independent  of
ubjective  factors  and  cannot  be  modiﬁed  at  will  by  human
eings,  is  captured  by  the  concept  of  ‘‘alternative  uses’’,
ut  not  by  ‘‘multiplicity  of  ends’’.  This  is  the  second  rea-
on  for  supporting  Souter’s  claim  that  both  concepts  are  not
quivalent,  and  it  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  ‘‘multiplicity
f  ends’’  cannot  be  a  factor  that  determines  the  existence
f  actual  economic  problems.
.3.  A  suggested  way  of  escaping  the  problems  of
obbins’s conception  of  scarcity
his  analysis  makes  it  clear  that  the  association  between
‘alternative  uses’’  and  ‘‘multiplicity  of  ends’’  implied  by
obbins  is  illicit.  Furthermore,  this  analysis  also  shows  that
he  real  factor  which,  together  with  limitation  in  sup-
ly,  gives  rise  to  economic  phenomena  is  the  existence  of
‘alternative  uses’’  for  means.  These  ﬁndings  add  a  new
roblem  to  the  list  of  unsettled  questions  from  the  subsec-
ion  3.1:  what  is  the  actual  status  of  ‘‘multiplicity  of  ends’’?
o  they  play  any  role  at  all  in  the  conﬁguration  of  economic
roblems?  The  conclusion  is  that,  although  Robbins  solved
any  old  problems  with  his  characterization  of  scarcity,  he
imultaneously  introduced  new  problems  into  the  science.
han ‘‘quantity rivalry’’, so means can become scarce for different
easons.
42 This is even clearer in the case of an individual person: Robinson
rusoe may want eggs for the sole purpose of eating them, but they
re scarce because the eggs he eats today (or for breakfast) are not
vailable for tomorrow (or for dinner). This fact provides Robinson
ith a rationale for considering the optimal timing of his consump-
ion -- which is an important type of economic problem, as Robbins
xplicitly recognizes (Essay, 13n). Notice that this is related to the
roblem of depletable resources explained in Section 4 below: even
f we want, say, coal for the unique purpose of, say, producing elec-
ricity, it makes sense to pose the economic problem of ﬁnding the
ptimal extraction rate of this resource. These examples reveal that
nds of action do not need to be plural for human behaviour to be
onditioned by scarcity; consequently ‘‘plurality of ends’’ cannot be
 requisite feature for human behaviour having an economic aspect.
bviously, all this implies that Robbins is wrong when using the num-
er of ends as a criterion to separate economics from technique --
his is a point that has already been criticized by other authors, e.g.
ivett (1965: 217--220).
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required  element  for  real  scarcity  to  appear,  consider  the
case  of  non-renewable  natural  resources.  The  alternative
character  of  their  use  is  manifested  in  the  fact  that  a  given
quantity  of  the  raw  material  can  be  used  today  or  tomorrow,
44 This also explains the terminology adopted: I have chosen toA  New  View  on  Robbins’s  Deﬁnition  of  Economics:  the  Notio
Fortunately,  it  is  possible  to  ﬁnd  a  solution  for  all  these
difﬁculties  at  once.  It  is  precisely  the  need  to  keep  the  con-
cepts  of  ‘‘multiple  ends’’  and  ‘‘alternative  uses’’  separate
which  suggests  that  Robbins’s  deﬁnition  can  be  conceptually
divided  into  two  separate  halves,  each  portion  containing
one  of  the  former  concepts.  As  shown  below,  the  location
of  these  expressions  in  Robbins’s  deﬁnition  additionally  sug-
gests  the  point  where  this  division  must  be  made.
Let  us  return  to  Robbins’s  deﬁnition.  At  the  risk  of  stating
the  obvious,  it  is  worth  emphasizing  in  the  ﬁrst  instance  that
what  this  deﬁnition  describes  is  the  science  of  economics,  as
its  opening  words  clearly  indicate.  Therefore,  the  remaining
text  must  be  read  as  an  explanation  of  different  aspects  of
the  science,  two  aspects  in  particular,  as  suggested  in  the
previous  paragraph.  This  implies  that  the  deﬁnition  can  be
divided  into  two  different  parts  which  focus  on  the  aspect
of  the  science  which  is  being  described  in  each  part:
(i)  The  ﬁrst  part  of  the  deﬁnition  is  composed  of  two  sepa-
rate  fragments,  i.e.  ‘‘which  studies  human  behaviour’’
[when  it  has  to  make  use  of]  ‘‘scarce  means  which  have
alternative  uses’’.  The  course  of  this  investigation  shows
that  these  fragments  refer  to  what  Robbins  considered
to  be:  (a)  the  subject-matter  of  the  science  (human
behaviour);  and  (b)  the  real  elements  that  shape  human
behaviour  and  which,  whenever  they  are  present,  make
this  behaviour  exhibit  the  (economic)  aspect  that  is  rel-
evant  to  the  science.
(ii)  The  second  part  of  the  deﬁnition,  i.e.,  ‘‘(.  .  .) as  a  rela-
tionship  of  ends  and  scarce  means’’  (emphasis  added),
characterizes  the  method  used  by  the  science  to  study
its  subject-matter.  This  reading  is  suggested  by:  (a)  the
conclusion  arrived  at  in  the  previous  subsection  that
‘‘multiple  ends’’  cannot  be  a  determinant  of  the  eco-
nomic  aspect  of  human  behaviour;  and  by  (b)  the  exact
wording  used  by  Robbins,  which  indicates  the  real  status
of  ‘‘multiplicity  of  ends’’.43
I propose  the  term  real  scarcity  to  refer  to  what  the
ﬁrst  sub-deﬁnition  describes  and  the  term  formal  scarcity
to  refer  to  what  the  second  sub-deﬁnition  describes,  given
that  both  are  related  to  the  central  concept  of  scarcity.
Notice  that  this  distinction  of  notions  only  applies  to  Rob-
bins’s  thinking.  That  is  to  say,  it  is  a  way  of  escaping  from
his  confusing  description  of  the  elements  that  are  required
for  human  behaviour  to  have  an  economic  aspect  --  i.e.  to
be  inﬂuenced  by  scarcity.  In  this  sense,  the  notion  of  real
scarcity  captures  those  factors  highlighted  by  Robbins  that,
according  to  my  previous  explanations,  are  actually  present
in  every  practical  instance  of  scarcity.  Just  for  this  reason,
this  notion  refers  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  science.  On
the  contrary,  the  notion  of  formal  scarcity  refers  to  those
factors  listed  by  Robbins  which  cannot  account  for  the  emer-
gence  of  scarcity  in  practice.  This  latter  notion  concerns
the  method  of  the  science  because  Robbins  (maybe  inad-
vertently)  slides  into  the  description  of  its  elements  what
really  are  theoretical  assumptions  used  to  gain  scientiﬁc
knowledge  about  the  economic  aspect  of  human  behaviour.
43 Note that the ﬁrst two words in italics suggest that what is being
described in this part is the way economics studies human behaviour.
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As  this  division  of  concepts  has  been  obtained  from  my
nalysis  of  Robbins’s  characterization  of  economics,  it  seems
onvenient  to  verify  that  each  notion  really  corresponds  to
he  aspect  of  the  science  it  intends  to  designate.  In  addition,
s  it  is  merely  a  suggestion  to  correctly  interpret  Robbins,
t  seems  appropriate  to  offer  additional  arguments  for  its
doption.  This  implies  showing:  (i)  whether  the  division
heds  light  on  the  conundrums  that  surround  the  concept  of
carcity  in  Robbins’s  writings  and  that  have  been  highlighted
n  Section  3.1; (ii)  whether  it  is  consistent  with  other  ideas
xpressed  by  Robbins  in  his  texts;  and  (iii)  whether  it  helps
o  gain  a  better  understanding  of  Robbins’s  overall  position.
he  following  two  sections  deal  with  all  these  issues  and
ne-tune  these  notions.
.  The notion of real scarcity as the subject
atter of the science and the breadth of
obbins’s deﬁnition
he  notion  of  real  scarcity  proposed  in  the  previous  sec-
ion  is  related  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  science,  because
his  concept  denotes  the  actual  conditions  which  generate
he  economic  dimension  of  human  behaviour.44 However,  a
recise  meaning  is  required  to  clarify  this  notion.  Since  Rob-
ins’s  held  contradictory  views  regarding  the  actual  content
f  scarcity  (see  Section  3.1),  his  writings  are  not  a  reli-
ble  guide  to  accurately  characterize  real  scarcity,  so  I will
nly  refer  to  Robbins  to  verify  whether  the  characteriza-
ion  proposed  is  compatible  with  what  he  said  and,  more
mportantly,  whether  it  sheds  light  on  his  texts.
My  suggestion  is  that  real  scarcity  must  be  understood
s  the  conjunction  of  limitation  of  means  and  the  existence
f  alternative  uses  for  them  or,  as  the  following  explana-
ions  will  make  clear,  as  limitation  caused  by  the  existence
f  alternative  uses  for  means.  Two  reasons  can  be  offered  to
nclude  the  existence  of  ‘‘alternative  uses’’  as  an  essential
lement  of  real  scarcity.  Firstly,  note  it  is  the  existence  of
t  least  one  use  for  a  given  substance  which  makes  the  lim-
tation  in  the  quantity  relevant  to  human  behaviour.  To  put
t  differently:  if  there  were  no  use  for  a  given  raw  material,
ts  (possible)  limitation  of  quantity  would  not  generate  any
elevant  problem  of  scarcity.  As  Neuyermayer  (2000:  328)
aid:  ‘‘Some  natural  resources  are  scarce  on  this  world  in
 physical  sense.  If  they  have  no  productive  use,  nobody
ares  about  this  scarcity,  however’’.45 Secondly,  to  see  why
he  alternative  character  of  the  uses  (of  a  means)  is  also  aesign it ‘‘real’’ because this term refers to requirements that take
lace in the real or actual world (not to theoretical requirements),
hich is the view that Robbins holds on scarcity, as Parsons (1934:
36) highlights.
45 The example of natural resources perfectly ﬁts the Robbinsian
onception of scarcity, see Essay (36). See also the quotes from
eckerman and Ray cited in Neuyermayer (2000:311), which rein-
orce the view explained in the text.
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ut  not  at  both  dates  --  even  if  the  uses  at  different  dates
re  qualitatively  identical,  i.e.  the  only  difference  between
hem  is  the  moment  in  which  the  material  is  used.  This  can
nly  happen  because  the  use  of  some  quantity  of  them  in
he  present  precludes  the  use  of  that  quantity  in  the  future
-  or,  in  technical  jargon,  because  they  are  depletable.  Note
hat  this  ‘‘alternative’’  character  is  also  a  requirement  for
hese  materials  to  be  scarce  for  they  would  not  be  scarce
t  all  if,  despite  being  available  in  a  limited  quantity,  the
ame  amount  of  resource  could  be  used  today  and  tomor-
ow,  i.e.  indeﬁnitely,  as  shown  by  Neuyermayer’s  (2000:  311)
xamples  of  nondepletable  resources.46 Obviously,  this  is  a
inimal  sense  of  the  term  ‘‘alternative’’,  for  more  complex
orms  of  ‘‘alternative  uses’’  appear  in  reality  (especially
hen  humans  interact  in  society,  see  note  41),  but  it  sufﬁces
o  show  why  it  is  a  necessary  condition  for  real  scarcity  to
ppear.
It  is  easy  to  show  that  these  two  features  of  real  scarcity
o  not  contradict  Robbins’s  conception  of  scarcity.  For  exam-
le,  the  requirement  that  raw  materials  must  have  (at  least
ne)  uses  to  be  scarce  is  implicit  in  the  informal  example  of
ad  eggs  that  appear  in  the  Essay  (46):  these  are  redundant
ecause  there  is  no  use  for  them.47 Besides,  the  quality  that
he  uses  of  a  means  must  be  alternative  is  clearly  seen  in
he  example  put  by  Robbins  to  refute  Sir  Joshia’s  position
hat  attention  to  the  æsthetic  will  in  the  long  run  increase
aterial  welfare  -- see  Essay  (29--30).48 Finally,  the  mini-
al  sense  that  can  be  put  to  the  notion  of  ‘‘alternative’’  is
ompletely  in  accordance  with  Robbins’s  characterization  of
ne  of  the  most  important  types  of  economic  action  --  i.e.
ntertemporal  choice,  see  Essay  (14n).
Understanding  real  scarcity  in  the  way  suggested  is  not
nly  in  agreement  with  Robbins’s  views,  but  also  has  great
dvantages,  for  it  sheds  light  on  other  parts  of  his  writings
nd  other  key  economic  principles.  Note  that,  once  real
carcity  is  understood  as  suggested,  it  not  only  provides  an
xact  interpretation  of  Robbins’s  texts,  but  it  also  (afﬁrma-
ively)  answers  the  question  of  whether  the  sole  presence
f  real  scarcity  sufﬁces  to  generate  economic  phenomena
46 The fact that the uses of the means must be alternative in
haracter is captured in other deﬁnitions of the science with the
ntroduction of the term ‘‘competing uses’’ -- see Rees (1968: 472).
hese are simply different ways of expressing the basic fact that
ses of must be ‘‘exclusive’’ in at least the minimal form explained
n the main text. This helps to understand why Mundell (1968: 7)
nds that the mere word ‘‘alternative’’ suggests scarcity -- it is at
he very core of the concept.
47 Other authors also introduce the same requirement, though in an
ndirect way. See, for example, Debreu (1959: 33) who explained:
‘(.  . .) some industrial waste product may be a nuisance the disposal
f which is costly; should an invention, i.e. a new technology, open
ses for it, it might become a scarce commodity.’’
48 Especially, the following text: ‘‘There are cases when it is either
read or a lily. Choice of the one involves sacriﬁce of the other (. . .)
conomics brings into full view that conﬂict of choice which is one
f the permanent characteristics of human existence’’, Essay (30,
mphasis added). The alternative character of the uses was also
acitly stated by Robbins in other parts of the Essay with the use
f words like ‘‘relinquishment’’ or ‘‘sacriﬁce’’, which refer to (and
akes sense only in relation to) that characteristic -- see Essay (14,
5, 25, 30, 145, 146,145) and Robbins (1934b: 90).
a
c
t
i
t
e
t
7
o
t
b
(
t
c
c
i
s
(
1
wI.  Falgueras-Sorauren
-  thus,  it  completely  clariﬁes  the  problems  mentioned  in
ection  3.1.
More  importantly,  this  interpretation  of  real  scarcity  can
elp  to  correctly  understand  the  status  of  choice,  which  is
 concept  that  in  the  Essay  ﬁrst  slides  into  the  description
f  the  subject-matter  of  the  science49 and  is  occasionally
ransformed  by  Robbins  into  its  actual  subject-matter  in  a
omewhat  imperceptible  manner.50 Choice  (among  alterna-
ive  uses  of  the  means)  is  the  outcome  of  the  inﬂuence  of
eal  scarcity  on  human  behaviour,  for  it  is  imposed  upon
s  by  the  alternative  character  of  the  uses  of  the  means
hat  is  introduced  by  the  presence  of  real  scarcity.  Note
hat  the  only  implication  of  the  presence  of  real  scarcity  is
hat  it  forces  us  to  choose  (among  alternative  uses  of  the
eans),  but  not  that  we  must  do  it  in  an  intelligent  way;
n  other  words:  we  cannot  eliminate  the  inﬂuence  of  real
carcity,  but  we  can  ignore  it  and  choose  without  complete
wareness  of  the  alternatives  rejected.  This  point  is  crucial
o  understanding  why  Robbins  considered  that  the  signiﬁ-
ance  of  economic  science  precisely  relies  on  its  ability  to
mpower  us  to  be  fully  aware  of  the  implications  of  what  we
re  choosing,  i.e.  of  the  value  of  the  alternatives  rejected
- see  Essay  (151--158)  or  Robbins  (1981:  2).
Obviously,  the  foregoing  description  of  choice  is  a
oherent  suggestion  regarding  how  to  interpret  Robbins’s
xplanations,  since  he  is  not  clear  on  this  point.  In  fact,  his
uzzy  characterization  of  the  elements  which  make  scarcity
hape  human  behaviour  is  so  spread  throughout  his  account
f  (economic)  choice,  that  the  status  of  this  concept  is
ll-deﬁned.  These  are  the  factors  which  bulk  large  in  the
‘breadth’’  of  Robbins’s  deﬁnition,  for  they  make  ‘‘choice’’
ndistinguishable  from  ‘‘choice  induced  by  scarcity’’.  And
his  mixing  of  concepts  constitutes  an  inﬂection  point  on  the
ay  economics  is  conceived.  The  science  took  a  (somewhat)
ong  route  which  ultimately  led  to  the  characterization  of
conomics  as  the  science  of  (any  rational)  choice51 --  i.e.
 method  without  a  proper  subject  matter.  However,  the
omplete  description  of  this  complex  process  falls  outside
he  purpose  of  this  paper,  and  it  will  be  addressed  in  other
nvestigations.
Finally,  the  concept  of  real  scarcity  also  makes  clear
he  centrality  of  other  related  concepts  and  principles  of
conomics,  namely,  the  concept  of  opportunity  cost  and
he  associated  TANSTAAFL  principle.  As  Buchanan  (1991:
18)  explained,  the  need  to  choose  implies  the  existence
f  selected  as  well  as  rejected  alternatives,  so  oppor-
unity  costs  are  the  expression  of  the  basic  relationship
etween  scarcity  and  choice.52 Because  of  the  ubiquity  of
49 See Essay (12, 15) and Robbins (1934b: 90). See also Howson
2011: 175): ‘‘(.  . .)  it is because of this necessity of choosing (. . .)
hat those aspects of human activity which we study as economists
ome into being’’.
50 See Essay (14, 20, 30, 83, 152). The imperceptible way in which
hoice is exchanged for scarcity as the subject-matter of the science
n the Essay has led some authors to argue that Robbins equated the
ubject-matter of economics with choice -- see, for example, Scoon
1943: 311), Buchanan (1964), O’Brien (1988:33) or Hodgson (2001:
95--196).
51 See Mundell (1968: v) or Gwartney, Stroup and Lee (2005: 5).
52 The link between the concepts of choice and opportunity cost
as recognized by Robbins (1934a:2).
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--  the  two  aims  of  economics.
The  fact  that  Robbins  advanced  a  similar  conception  of
human  action56 helps  to  understand  why  he  defended  that
54 Note that what is explained in this paragraph is in completely
agreement with Robbins’s views, as my previous analysis reveals.
55 This is the point that has been raised by some commentators
or critics of Robbins. For example, Parsons (523--524) explained
that human behaviour is articulated into a complicated chain of
means-ends relationships, in which most of the elements are located
between the polar categories of the ‘‘ultimate end’’ and the
‘‘ultimate means’’ -- on this point see also Crespo (2007: 376). InA  New  View  on  Robbins’s  Deﬁnition  of  Economics:  the  Notio
real  scarcity,  we  are  constantly  facing  opportunity  costs  in
our  actions  such  that  these  are  revealed  to  be  a  pervasive
trait  of  human  behaviour,  which  subsequently  leads  to  the
formulation  of  the  TANSTAAFL  principle.53
5. The notion of  formal scarcity as the
method of the science and the formalism of
Robbins’s deﬁnition
So  far,  the  argument  has  showed  that  the  existence  of
‘‘alternative  uses’’  (for  means)  is  a  deﬁning  feature  of  real
scarcity,  that  is,  the  actual  subject-matter  of  economics.
However,  the  other  part  of  the  claim  made  in  Section  3.3
remains  to  be  justiﬁed,  that  is,  that  the  existence  of  a
‘‘plurality  of  ends’’  is  a  condition  related  to  the  method
of  the  science  --  at  least  as  this  ‘‘plurality  of  ends’’  is
conceived  by  Robbins.  This  is  the  task  of  this  section.  The
argument  attempts  to  show  that  all  the  elements  which  are
associated  with  the  two  basic  features  of  Robbins’s  deﬁni-
tion  that  I  have  classiﬁed  as  belonging  to  the  method  of
the  science  (ends  and  means)  have  a  theoretical  category.
Therefore,  they  are  not  real  conditions  for  the  emergence
of  an  economic  problem,  but  rather  they  are  conditions  for
the  science  to  properly  illuminate  actual  economic  prob-
lems.  To  show  this  point,  I  will  disentangle  the  process  by
which  economics  analyses  human  action  and  will  point  out
its  similitudes  with  Robbins’s  description  of  the  elements
that  fall  under  my  notion  of  formal  scarcity.
To  follow  the  argument,  note  that  economics  belongs  to
the  category  of  knowledge  that  treats  human  behaviour  as
problem-solving,  as  Knight  (1940a:  464;  1940b:  26--27)  cor-
rectly  explained.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  economics
studies  the  human  problem  caused  by  the  emergence  of  real
scarcity.  As  described  above,  real  scarcity  imposes  a  cost  on
every  human  action  that  cannot  be  avoided  and  should  be
taken  into  account  in  order  to  make  more  intelligent  use  of
the  resources  at  our  disposal.  The  point  is  that  this  prob-
lem  of  assigning  scarce  resources  to  different  goals  can  take
many  different  forms  in  reality,  so  it  actually  represents  a
family  of  problems.  In  this  sense,  the  task  of  economics
is  to  identify  this  family  of  problems,  ﬁrstly,  by  correctly
understanding  their  foundations,  and  secondly,  by  ﬁnding
the  most  adequate  solution  to  each  particular  problem.  This,
in  turn,  requires  that  the  common  elements  of  the  differ-
ent  speciﬁc  problems  as  well  as  their  common  structure  are
brought  to  the  light  in  such  a  way  that  the  inﬂuence  of  real
scarcity  on  human  behaviour  is  correctly  captured  by  the
theory.  It  is  precisely  for  this  reason  why  economic  theory
is  considered  ‘‘analytical’’,  as  Knight  (1940a:  462)  argues:
human  behaviour  is  analyzed  in  terms  of  the  fundamental
categories  that  are  present  in  each  of  these  particular  prob-
lems,  so  that  cause-effect  explanations  can  be  deduced  and
the  consequences  of  certain  courses  of  actions  (or  choices)
53 See Hessen (1987: 285) for a brief history and explanation of
this principle and Colander (2005: 253) for the presence of these
elements (scarcity, opportunity costs and the TANSTAAFL principle)
in current teaching in microeconomic courses. The explanations
of Gwartney, Stroup and Lee (2005: 8--10) provide an additional
example of the centrality and interrelation of these concepts.
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an  be  clearly  established.54 Obviously,  this  is  a  kind  of  sci-
ntiﬁc  knowledge  that  demands  a  formal  representation  of
eal  scarcity.
.1.  First  stage:  the  division  of  human  action  into
wo polar  categories
he  formal  representation  of  real  scarcity  is  developed  in
 two-stage  process  in  theory.  In  the  ﬁrst  stage,  human
ehaviour  is  framed  in  terms  of  two  radical  categories:  ends
nd  means.  Accordingly,  the  elements  that  play  the  roles  of
nds  and  of  means  are  clearly  identiﬁed  and  distinguished
n  theory.  Note  that  this  clear-cut  categorization  is  a  formal
equisite  and  not  a  real  one,  since  human  action  is  more
omplex  and  the  different  elements  do  not  admit  of  this
adical  classiﬁcation.55 However,  the  complexity  of  human
ehaviour  is  not  an  obstacle  to  using  ends  and  means  as
olar  categories  to  analyze  it.  Note  that,  at  each  stage  of
he  sequence  of  human  action  (see  note  55),  the  inﬂuence
f  real  scarcity  on  human  behaviour  gives  rise  to  problems
hat  have  a  similar  means-ends  structure.  This  means-ends
tructure  stems  from  the  fact  that,  at  some  point  within
he  process  of  human  decisions  and  actions,  we  have  to
top  deliberating  about  what  we  want  to  do,  as  Crespo
2007:  373)  points  out.  As  the  outcome  of  this  interrup-
ion,  the  elements  that  the  actor  wants  to  reach  with  his
r  her  (immediate)  action  become  the  (immediate)  follow-
ng  links  of  the  complex  ‘‘chain’’  of  human  action  --  i.e.  the
immediate)  ends,  which  additionally  are  now  taken  as  given
respo  (2007:  373).  On  the  other  hand,  the  achievements
erformed  in  previous  actions  constitute  the  conditions  that
he  acting  man  has  to  use  to  reach  this  (immediate)  following
ink  --  the  means,  which  are  now  the  focus  of  the  attention  of
he  actor  Crespo  (ibid.). Finally,  the  tension  that  these  ele-
ents  exhibit  in  the  theory  formally  captures  the  relative
tatus  of  real  scarcity  and  its  inﬂuence  on  current  choice.
his  common  and  simpliﬁed  structure  is  key  to  comprehend-
ng  the  foundations  of  economic  problems  and  to  solve  themhis intermediate sector, the end or purpose of a given human activ-
ty is the means to a further end or ends [see Kaufmann (1933:383)];
ence, the different links of the chain play the role of ends or means
epending on the problem at hand. The typical case is money, which
s the end of wage-work but, simultaneously, the means of consump-
ion, as Parsons (1934: 523) pointed out. To put it differently, ends
except the ultimate one) are such only in relation to the particu-
ar and immediate context of action, as Kirzner (1976: 126) pointed
ut.
56 Though this clear-cut distinction is not explicitly defended by
obbins, it is implicit in his insistence on considering ends and means
he two different sources of the changes in conditions of scarcity --
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inﬂuence  of  real  scarcity  on  human  action  in  a  fruitful  way,
and  are  not  conditions  for  its  emergence.  In other  words,
it  is  a  scientiﬁc  description  of  real  scarcity,  but  it  is  not  a
it is not possible to work out in theory the opportunity cost of dis-
placed alternatives -- which is the way in which economic theory
understands costs, as Robbins (1934a: 2--3) explained. However, this6  
i)  these  elements  of  human  behaviour  are  not  relevant  to
conomics  in  themselves;  rather,  it  is  their  relationship  that
s  of  interest  to  economic  science  [see  Essay  (38)],  and  (ii)
conomics  is  not  concerned  with  the  process  of  selection  of
nds  --  despite  this  being  a  real  problem,  as  acknowledged
y  Knight  (1940a:  464--465).
.2.  Second  stage:  the  theoretical  assumptions
bout the  goals  of  action
n  the  second  stage,  it  is  assumed  that  the  elements  that
lay  the  role  of  ends  in  the  theory  must  be  (i)  hierarchically
rdered  (see  note  35  for  the  places  where  Robbins  explic-
tly  expresses  this  view  about  ends),  and  (ii)  weighted  in
uch  a  way  that  progressive  comparisons  among  them  are
ossible.  Clearly,  the  ﬁrst  element  is  a  theoretical  require-
ent  for  capturing  the  inﬂuence  of  real  scarcity  but  not
 practical  requirement  for  its  emergence,  as  revealed  by
obbins’s  recognition  that  scarcity  shapes  human  behaviour
ven  if  ends  are  not  consistent  --  see  note  40  above.  More-
ver,  Robbins  suggested  that  economics  assumes  rationality
e.g.  consistency  of  ends)  because  it  is  desirable  to  do  so  in
rder  to  facilitate  the  selection  of  a  system  of  ends  that
re  mutually  consistent  with  each  other  --  here,  Robbins
efers  to  a  consistency  of  achievement  (of  ends),  which  is
ot  the  same  requirement  as  the  (theoretical)  consistency
f  ends,  see  Essay  (152n).  To  put  it  differently,  the  existence
f  a  hierarchically  ordered  set  of  ends  is  a  condition  for  the
heory  to  be  fruitfully  applied  to  the  solution  of  practical
conomic  problems.
The  fact  that  the  second  assumption  mentioned  above
oes  not  explicitly  appear  in  the  Essay  and  is  only  implicit  in
 few  passages  hides  its  actual  relevance  to  the  theory  and
omplicates  the  task  of  correctly  assessing  it.57 This  sec-
nd  assumption  is  what  Nicolaides  (1988:  320)  called  the
‘continuity’’  principle  (of  neoclassical  economics),  which
e  considers  to  be  central  to  economic  analysis:
‘‘(.  .  .) This  term  is  chosen  on  purpose  to  exemplify  a
fundamental  and  yet  not  easily  recognized  aspect  of
economic  choice.  The  whole  of  economics  is  about  conti-
nuity:  all  goods  and  services  are  comparable  in  generating
either  utility  or  disutility;  (.  .  .) decisions  are  made  at  the
margin  after  assessing  all  possible  effects  and  costs  (..)  Of
course  in  each  case  continuity  is  deﬁned  differently,  but
all  these  deﬁnitions  have  the  common  element  that  all
segment’s  in  an  agent’s  set  of  choice  are  comparable.’’In  other  words,  one  basic  assumption  in  economic  the-
ry  is,  using  Lazear’s  (2000:  101)  jargon,  that  trade-offs  can
lways  be  computed,  at  least  on  the  margin.58 The  key  point
ee Essay (16, 36, 38, 44). It is also implicit in his rejection of ends
rom the sphere of economics -- see Falgueras-Sorauren (2015).
57 Robbins referred to this element as ‘‘ratios of valuation between
oods’’ [Essay (16)], ‘‘internal arbitrage operations’’ [Essay (92)]
nd only makes explicit reference to the ‘‘indifference curves’’ in
ery few places in passing [Essay (35n, 75, 87,126, 141)].
58 In fact, many economists consider these trade-offs to be a deﬁn-
ng feature of the economist’s point of view -- e.g. Buchanan (1966:
68), Harcourt (1979: 246, 250 n5) or Amacher, Tollison and Willett
1976: 20--21). Note that, if these trade-offs cannot be computed,
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s  that  this  is  a  theoretical  assumption  that  is  also  necessary
o  illuminate  real  human  economic  problems  using  economic
cience;  otherwise  they  would  not  be  relevant  in  formal
erms.  That  this  is  a  theoretical  hypothesis  is  not  hard  to
ee,  as  shown  by  Arrow’s  (1997:  759)  defence  of  it.  To  see  its
heoretical  relevance,  note  that  it  is  possible  to  have  hier-
rchically  ordered  ends  for  which  no  rates  of  interchange  or
acriﬁce  among  them  (or  among  goods)  can  be  established  --
ake  the  example  of  lexicographic  preferences.  In  this  case,
 formal  problem  would  still  exist,  although  it  would  be  a
rivial  one,  for  there  is  only  one  rational  way  of  allocating
eans  to  ends:  these  preferences  dictate  that  the  means  can
nly  be  allocated  to  reach  the  most  preferred  end  in  the  list
- and  if  some  means  are  left  after  this  operation,  prefer-
nces  dictate  that  the  remaining  means  have  to  be  devoted
o  reach  the  second  end  in  the  list,  and  so  on.  Since  trade-
ffs  between  the  ends  cannot  be  computed,  means  cannot
e  redistributed  to  produce  a  preferred  (or  indifferent)  com-
inations  of  ends;  hence,  economic  science  cannot  be  of
uch  guide.59 This  is  the  ultimate  reason  why  Nicolaides
ibid.)  afﬁrmed  that  ‘‘every  failure  of  the  paradigm  of  the
ational  maximizing  agent  can  be  interpreted  as  a  break-
own  in  continuity’’,  or  why  Nutter  (1979)  has  argued  that
he  presence  of  lexicographic  preferences  imposes  a  limit
n  the  applicability  of  economic  science  that  goes  beyond
ts  traditional  boundaries.
In  conclusion,  for  economic  theory  to  be  relevant  to  solv-
ng  a  problem,  the  existence  of  a  hierarchy  of  ends  it  is  not
nly  required,  but  also  the  possibility  of  quantifying  how
uch  of  a  given  end  a  person  is  willing  to  give  up  to  obtain
ore  of  another  --  the  Hicksian  marginal  rate  of  substitution
see  Hicks  (1981:  8--10)].  As  Knight  (1934:  232n)  explained,
his  is  the  reason  why  the  indifference  surface  is  indispens-
ble  if  comparison  and  choice  are  to  be  used  in  the  sense
f  cause  and  effect  to  explain  behaviour.  The  key  point  is
hat,  once  again,  both  are  formal  requisites  for  economic
heory  to  be  useful  for  practical  purposes.  They  are  for-
al  because,  as  should  now  be  clear,  the  characteristics
xplained  above  are  requisites  for  capturing  in  theory  theoes not imply that this cost does not exist.
59 As marginal utility is not quantitatively deﬁnable in the ordi-
al utility approach, indifference surfaces are needed to know how
uch quantity of a good would compensate the chooser for the loss
f a marginal unit of another good [see Hicks (1981:9)]. In the case
f lexicographic preferences it is not possible to calculate this quan-
ity because the indifference curves are single points. Note that this
roblem is relevant only from a theoretical point of view: it affects
he capacity of the theory to illuminate behaviour, but does not
lter the fact that this behaviour is conditioned by real scarcity.
his point should be kept in mind to avoid the kind of mistake made
y Polanyi (1994:100), who erroneously considered that the exam-
le of the text is a case of insufﬁcient, but not scarce, means. Other
xamples in which a hierarchy of ends exists but in which there is no
oom for ‘‘economic calculation’’ (i.e. the notion of formal scarcity
annot illuminate these cases) can be found in Etzioni (1988: 42).
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NA  New  View  on  Robbins’s  Deﬁnition  of  Economics:  the  Notio
good  characterization  of  the  conditions  that  determine  the
emergence  of  the  economic  aspect  of  human  behaviour.  This
view  of  scarcity  as  a  relationship  between  limited  means  and
multiple  ends  that  are  hierarchically  ordered  and  that  can
be  progressively  compared  is  what  I  call  formal  scarcity60;
it  is  also  what  the  second  part  of  Robbins’s  deﬁnition  inte-
grates.
6. Conclusion
It  is  now  time  to  round  off  the  argument  and  show  how  this
long  journey  through  the  intricacies  of  Robbins’s  writings
serves  to  clarify  the  three  problematic  issues  posed  in  the
introduction.
The  initial  analysis  of  the  problems  regarding  the  subject-
matter  of  the  science  that  the  classical  economists  left
unresolved  has  shown  that  they  coincided  with  the  main
difﬁculties  that  Robbins  was  trying  to  solve.  His  search  for
a  solution  led  him  to  rethink  the  deﬁnition  of  the  science,
substituting  (material)  wealth  by  scarcity  as  the  underlying
factor  that  makes  different  activities  susceptible  to  being
studied  by  economic  science.  As  the  result  of  this  substitu-
tion,  the  new  deﬁnition  changed  the  way  the  subject-matter
was  conceived,  which  explains  why  some  authors  consid-
ered  it  to  be  the  turning  point  that  marked  the  passage
from  the  old  ‘‘political  economy’’  to  the  new  ‘‘economics’’.
This  substitution  also  paved  the  way  for  the  solution  of
other  methodological  issues  that  puzzled  Robbins,as  the
author  himself  indicated  (Robbins,  1971:  147).  This  contra-
dicts  the  view  that  the  deﬁnition  of  the  science  was  not
Robbins’s  central  concern  in  the  Essay, as  Colander  (2009:
438)  argued,  and  shows  that,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  the  key
element  around  which  all  the  remaining  ideas  in  the  Essay
are  organized.
However,  my  exposition  has  also  made  it  clear  that
Robbins’s  characterization  of  scarcity  is  plagued  with  impre-
cision,  which  also  obscures  its  exact  status  as  regards
the  subject-matter  of  the  science,  e.g.  does  Robbins  con-
sider  that  scarcity  is  the  actual  subject-matter  of  the
science  or  is  it  merely  a  key  condition  for  it?  In  particu-
lar,  the  article  shows  that,  as  Souter  stated,  ‘‘alternative
uses’’  and  ‘‘plurality  of  ends’’  are  not  interchangeable
terms  that  can  be  used  to  denote  the  same  basic  fea-
ture  of  scarcity.  The  need  to  keep  both  concepts  apart
shows  that  Robbins’s  deﬁnition  actually  contains  two  sub-
deﬁnitions:  one  that  describes  the  subject-matter  of  the
science  (which  I  have  called  real  scarcity)  and  another
that  integrates  its  method  (which  I  called  formal  scarcity).
This  ﬁnding  justiﬁes  the  position  of  authors  who  argued
that  Robbins’s  deﬁnition  describes  the  method  of  the  sci-
ence,  since  this  is  what,  de  facto,  part  of  this  deﬁnition
does.
Simultaneously,  this  distinction  between  real  and  for-
mal  scarcity  sheds  light  on  the  foundations  of  the
60 I have chosen the term formal scarcity because, ﬁrstly, it is
in line with Robbins’s view that the science of economics studies
the form of economic phenomena, i.e. their general uniformities
-- see Howson (2004: 428--249). Secondly, it has resonances of the
way Polanyi (1957: 243--248) refers to Robbins’s characterization of
economics.
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wo  well-known  implications  of  Robbins’s  deﬁnition:  its
‘breadth’’  and  its  ‘‘formalism’’.  On  the  one  hand,  the
‘formalism’’  or  ‘‘narrowness’’  of  Robbins’s  deﬁnition  arises
rom  the  concept  of  formal  scarcity,  because,  in  order  to
apture  the  inﬂuence  of  real  scarcity  on  human  behaviour,
his  method  reduces  it  to  just  two  basic  categories:  ends
nd  means.  On  the  other  hand,  the  ‘‘breadth’’  of  Rob-
ins’s  deﬁnition  is  related  to  the  concept  of  real  scarcity
n  two  different  ways.  The  scope  is  initially  widened
s  the  result  of  substituting  wealth  by  real  scarcity,  as
ntroduced  in  Robbins’s  deﬁnition.  Since  this  breaks  with
he  false  limits  imposed  on  the  subject-matter  by  for-
er  deﬁnitions,  it  encourages  the  reconsideration  of  the
conomic  aspect  of  topics  previously  considered  to  be
oneconomic.  However,  the  scope  was  mainly  widened  due
o  Robbins’s  failure  to  correctly  identify  the  conditions
or  the  emergence  of  real  scarcity.  This  failure  produces
n  incomplete  characterization  of  economic  choice  --  or
hoice  under  the  inﬂuence  of  scarcity  --  which  subse-
uently  led  economists  to  equate  choice  resulting  from
he  inﬂuence  of  scarcity  to  choice  in  general.  As  a  conse-
uence,  the  deﬁnition  generates  the  false  impression  that
ll  types  of  (human)  choice  are  germane  to  the  study  of
conomics.
The  concepts  of  real  and  formal  scarcity  also  account
or  the  particular  inﬂuence  exerted  by  this  deﬁnition  on
he  subsequent  evolution  of  the  science.  The  expansion  of
conomists’  interests  is  a consequence  of  the  ‘‘breadth’’
f  Robbins’s  deﬁnition,  while  the  narrowing  of  professional
nterest  to  certain  types  of  methods  is  the  outcome  of  the
nﬂuence  of  its  ‘‘formalism’’.  This  conclusion  brings  to  light,
lthough  only  in  an  embryonic  way,  the  inﬂuence  of  Rob-
ins’s  deﬁnition  on  the  emergence  of  economic  imperialism.
evertheless,  the  analysis  presented  is  insufﬁcient  to  cor-
ectly  appreciate  the  exact  way  this  inﬂuence  was  exerted,
ince  this  is  a  theme  that  requires  more  detailed  study  and
hat  must  be  postponed  to  future  investigations.
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